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JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ARBITRATION AWARDS: MANIFEST
DISREGARD OF THE LAW*
Norman S. Poser'
INTRODUCTION
Two recent Second Circuit decisions involving claims of age
discrimination, DiRussa v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.' and
Halligan v. Piper Jaffray, Inc.,2 raise the perplexing question of
what is the proper scope of judicial review of arbitration awards?
Speed, economy, and finality, the principal goals of arbitration,
suggest that judicial review should be narrow; on the other hand,
fairness and justice require that there be meaningful review of
awards, particularly when a party is asserting statutory rights.
In fact, judicial review of arbitration awards is strictly limited.'
It is well established that a court may not modify or vacate an
award simply because the arbitrator made an error, misinterpreta-
tion, or misapplication of law. The award may be vacated only if
the proceeding was tainted with corruption, misconduct or bias; if
the arbitrator exceeded his or her authority; or if the arbitrator acted
© 1998 Norman S. Poser. All Rights Reserved.
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121 F.3d 818 (2d Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 695 (1998).
2 148 F.3d 197 (2d Cir. 1998).
1 Arbitrators' decisions are commonly referred to as 'awards,' even where the arbi-
trators deny any recovery to the claimant.
" See Harry T. Edwards, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea or Anathema?, 99
HARv. L. REV. 668, 679 (1986) (Inexpensive, expeditious, and informal adjudication is
not always synonymous with fair and just adjudication.'). Judge Edwards sits on the
District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals.
5 For a discussion of judicial review under the Federal Arbitration Act ('FAA), see
infra text accompanying notes 147-184.
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in "manifest.disregard of the law."6 Under Second Circuit law,
"manifest disregard" means that (1) the arbitrators knew the law,
"yet refused to apply it or ignored it... ; and (2) the law ignored
by the arbitrators was well defined, explicit, and clearly applicable
to the case."7
The two Second Circuit opinions, both written by Judge
Wilfred Feinberg,8 attempted to apply the "manifest disregard" stan-
dard, with results that were strikingly different. In DiRussa, the
court's strict application of the standard resulted in the denial of the
claimant's rights under a federal anti-discrimination statute. In
Halligan, the court employed the manifest disregard standard to
enforce the claimant's rights under the same statute, but it had to
ignore precedent to do so. These cases amply demonstrate that, at
least in the context of arbitrations based on statutory discrimination
claims, manifest disregard is not an appropriate standard of review,
and the courts should explicitly recognize this.
Raymond DiRussa and Theodore Halligan were both long-time
employees of brokerage firms who initiated arbitrations against their
firms for violation of the Federal Age Discrimination in Employment
Act of 1967 ("ADEA").9 As a condition of employment, DiRussa
and Halligan were required to register with the New York Stock
Exchange ("NYSE") and the National Association of Securities Deal-
ers ("NASD") and to sign an application form with these organiza-
tions that included an agreement to arbitrate any dispute that might
arise in connection with their employment."
In DiRussa, the arbitration panel appointed by the NYSE ruled
in his favor and awarded him damages but refused to award
attorney's fees, notwithstanding a provision of the ADEA requiring
that a successful claimant receive reasonable attorney's fees. The
district court denied a motion to modify or vacate the award, and
the Second Circuit affirmed. The Second Circuit found that the
arbitrators' failure to award attorney's fees was clearly erroneous.
6 See Merrill Lynch, Pierce Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Bobker, 808 F.2d 930 (2d Cir.
1986).
Halligan, 148 F.3d at 202 (citing DiRussa, 121 F.3d at 821).
8 In addition to Judge Feinberg, the DiRussa panel consisted of Judges Oakes and
Leval, while the Halligan panel consisted of Judge Kearse and District Court Judge
Barrington Parker, sitting by designation.
9 29 U.S.C.A §§ 621-634 (1985).
10 The defendants in the two cases were member firms of both the NYSE and the
NASD. The NYSE and the NASD register employees of their member firms by using
Form U-4, which includes an arbitration clause.
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Nevertheless, it held that the arbitrators did not act "in manifest
disregard of the law" because, although DiRussa raised the issue of
attorney's fees at the arbitration hearing, he did not "communi-
cate.., to the arbitrators that the ADEA mandated such an award
to a prevailing party."11
In Halligan, the employee initiated an arbitration with the
NASD. At the hearing, he presented strong (though contested) evi-
dence supporting his age discrimination claim, but the arbitration
panel nevertheless denied him any relief. The district court refused
to vacate the award for manifest disregard of the law on the ground
that its role was not to second-guess the arbitrators' fact-finding. The
Second Circuit reversed, holding that the court reviewing the award
may consider the arbitrators' failure to explain their decision in
concluding that they acted in manifest disregard for the law.2
The issue of the scope of review of arbitration decisions cannot
be considered in isolation. It arises in these and many other cases,
in situations where employees have been required to agree to man-
datory arbitration as a condition of employment. Moreover, DiRussa
and Halligan's claims were based on the violation of a federal stat-
ute that specifically gives employees redress for discrimination
based on age. These types of disputes involve issues with which
securities arbitrators are unlikely to have knowledge or experience.
Thus, in order to properly address the problems with the man-
ifest disregard standard in this setting, it is necessary first to discuss
three related issues: (1) should an arbitration clause in an employ-
ment agreement be enforceable, particularly where the employee is
required to sign the agreement as a condition of his or her employ-
ment? (2) even if such an arbitration clause is generally enforceable,
should arbitration of a claim brought by an employee under a feder-
al or state anti-discrimination statute be mandatory? (3) is the stan-
dard of competence applicable to an arbitrator deciding an
employment discrimination claim adequate?
It is the thesis of this Article that the manifest disregard stan-
dard for judicial review of arbitration awards should be replaced by
a standard that would require the reviewing court to modify or
vacate an award if the award egregiously departs from established
legal principles, even if the arbitrator is ignorant of the correct law.
Because such a standard would still be considerably narrower than
DiRussa, 121 F.3d at 823.
£2 Halligan v. Piper Jaffray, Inc., 148 F.3d 197 (2d Cir. 1998).
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the scope of review that an appellate court applies to the judgment
of a trial court, it would not seriously undercut the policy favoring
finality of arbitral decisions. Although the need for a new standard
of review is clearest in the case of claims involving statutory rights,
the proposed standard would apply to all arbitration awards.
Part I of this Article describes the DiRussa and Halligan deci-
sions. Part II discusses the arbitrability of employment agreements
under the FAA. Part III reviews current law and practices regarding
the arbitration of employment discrimination claims. Part IV discuss-
es the competence of NASD and NYSE arbitrators to decide such
claims. Following the discussion of these background issues, Part V
returns to the principal issue of the DiRussa and Halligan cases: the
appropriateness of the "manifest disregard of the law" standard for
vacating or modifying an arbitration award. Finally, Part VI formu-
lates a proposed standard of review that recognizes both the impor-
tance of finality of arbitral decisions and the need to provide the
parties in an arbitration with the same fundamental rights they
would enjoy in a court proceeding.
I. THE DIRUSSA AND HALLIGAN DECISIONS
A. DiRussa v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.
In 1992, Raymond DiRussa, age fifty-eight, was the branch
manager of the Morristown, New Jersey office of Dean Witter
Reynolds, Inc. ("DWR"), one of the largest brokerage firms in the
country. DiRussa had been with the firm for almost forty-two years.
On May 8, 1992, the firm demoted DiRussa to the position of
account executive (i.e., salesman).' DiRussa challenged his demo-
tion by filing charges of employment discrimination with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") and with the New
Jersey Division on Civil Rights. 4 When the EEOC declined to pur-
sue DiRussa's claim, he initiated an NASD arbitration proceeding
against DWR and' Lawrence Solari, a regional director of DWR.' s
13 Petition for Certiorari at 3, DiRussa v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 121 F.3d 818
(2d Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 695 (1998).
14 Id.
is The EEOC cannot obtain monetary relief from a brokerage firm on behalf of a
person asserting claims under the ADEA if that person has entered into a valid arbitra-
tion agreement. See Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Kidder, Peabody & Co.,
Inc., 979 F. Supp. 245, 247 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
[Vol. 64:2474
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The arbitration panel consisted of three arbitrators, all from the
securities industry, two of whom were lawyers, including one who
had prior experience in employment law.'" DiRussa claimed he
had been demoted because of his age, in violation of the ADEA and
the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination ("NJLAD")." After sev-
en days of hearings held over a six-month period, the arbitration
panel found in DiRussa's favor and awarded him $200,000 in dam-
ages against both defendants and an additional $20,000 against
Solari. However, the arbitrators denied DiRussa's request for an
award of $249,010.50 in attorneys' fees and explicitly denied all
other relief. 8 As is customary in securities-industry arbitrations, the
arbitrators did not file a written opinion containing findings of fact
or conclusions of law. 9 Thus, the arbitrators' reasons for denying
DiRussa's request for attorneys' fees are not known.
DiRussa moved in federal district court to modify or vacate the
award insofar as it denied attorney's fees on the ground that the
ADEA requires the award of reasonable attorney's fees to a party
who recovers a judgment under the statute.20 The district court
found that the "factual predicate" of DiRussa's claim that the ADEA
mandated an award of attorney's fees to a successful claimant was
"entirely accurate," and that "it is difficult to imagine a more 'well
defined, explicit and clearly applicable' provision of governing law
than the ADEA's mandate that successful age discrimination claim-
DiRussa was required to arbitrate his claim because he had signed a Form U-4
when he registered with the NYSE, as he was required to do in order to work as a
'registered representative' for an NYSE member firm. The U-4 contained an arbitration
agreement. See text accompanying infra note 75.
,6 Petition for Certiorari at 3.
17 NJ. STAT. ANN. §§ 10:5-1 to 10:5-42 (West 1993). The district court's opinion
stated that DiRussa claimed that he had been wrongfully terminated because of his age.
DiRussa v. Dean witter Reynolds, Inc., 936 F. Supp. 104, 106 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), aff'd,
121 F.3d 818 (2d Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 695 (1998). The Second Circuit's
opinion, however, refers only to his claim that he was demoted from the position of
branch manager to that of account executive. DiRussa, 121 F.3d at 820. Because the
district court sealed the record of the case, it is not possible to ascertain whether
DiRussa was terminated as well as demoted.
Ie DiRussa, 121 F.3d at 820.
19 Petition for Certiorari at 3.
o Section 216(b) of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1994), which
is incorporated by reference in § 626(b) of the ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1994), pro-
vides that '[t]he court . . . shall, in addition to any judgment awarded to the plain-
tiff . . . allow a reasonable attorney's fee to be paid by the defendant, and costs of the
action.' DiRussa, 936 F. Supp. at 106.
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ants such as plaintiff recover attorney's fees."21 Nevertheless, the
court refused to vacate or modify the award, on the ground that the
claimant's counsel never argued to the arbitrators that an award of
counsel fees was mandatory.22 Thus, "the arbitrator's rejection of
plaintiff's claim for attorney's fees under the ADEA does not fall
within any of the limited grounds for vacating an arbitration award
found in the ... FAA." 23 The district court also placed the file un-
der seal, so that none of the documents generated by the arbitration
and litigation, other than the court's opinion, were placed in the
public file.24
A panel of the Second Circuit unanimously affirmed the district
court's decision. The panel agreed with the district court's view that
the governing law requiring an award of attorney's fees was 'well
defined, explicit and clearly applicable."2  However, the court
found itself powerless to disturb the arbitral decision rejecting
DiRussa's application for attorney's fees, even though it was clearly
erroneous. According to the court, the arbitrators' error did not fall
within one of the grounds for vacatur or modification of an arbitra-
tion award set forth in the FAA, nor did the arbitrators act in mani-
fest disregard of the law, a non-statutory ground for setting aside an
arbitral award that has been adopted by most of the circuit courts,
including the Second Circuit.26 Although the arbitrators failed to
apply a "well defined, explicit and clearly applicable" rule of law,
their failure did not constitute manifest disregard of the law because
"at no point did DiRussa communicate ... to the arbitrators that the
ADEA mandated such an award to a prevailing party. "27 Finally,
2, DiRussa, 936 F. Supp. at 106.
22 See id. at 107. Plaintiff's counsel's submissions on attorney's fees dealt only with
the NJLAD, which provides that in such cases 'the prevailing party may be awarded a
reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs.' N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10.5-27.1 (West 1993)
(emphasis added).
2 DiRussa, 936 F.Supp. at 106.
24 Id. at 108. Because the district court placed the file under seal, none of the
briefs, other than the Petition for Certiorari to the Supreme Court and the Opposition to
the Petition for Certiorari, are available for inspection.
I DiRussa, 121 F.3d at 822 (quoting DiRussa, 936 F. Supp. at 106).
26 Id. at 822-23.
27 Id.
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the court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in
ordering that the file be sealed.28 The Supreme Court denied
DiRussa's Petition for Certiorari.29
B. Halligan v. PiperJaffray, Inc.
Theodore Halligan had worked at Piper Jaffray, Inc. for almost
twenty years as a salesman of equity investments to financial institu-
tions when, according to his ADEA claim, he was terminated be-
cause of his age. At the time of his termination, he was sixty-nine
years of age." He was one of the firm's top salesmen, earning
nearly $500,000 a year. Halligan initiated an arbitration before the
NASD." Halligan and other witnesses testified at the hearing that
several Piper Jaffray personnel had expressed their intention to oust
Halligan because of his age. All of the Piper personnel who tes-
tified at the hearing denied making these statements. Piper claimed
that Halligan had chosen to retire; it also argued that his poor per-
formance and health justified terminating him. Various witnesses
testified, however, that Halligan was always able to perform his job.
After Halligan left the firm, the firm assigned his customers'
accounts to two younger men. 33
After forty-nine hearing sessions over a two-year period,34 the
arbitration panel, without writing an opinion explaining its decision,
denied Halligan any relief. A district court judge refused to vacate
the award on the ground that the arbitrators manifestly disregarded
the law since there was support for the arbitrators' conclusion and,
furthermore, the court's role was not to weigh the conflicting evi-
23 Id. at 827-28. The issue of the sealing of the record of the case is beyond the
scope of this article.
=' Petition for Certiorari.
o Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at 8, Halligan v. Piper Jaffray, Inc., 148 F.3d 197 (2d
Cir. 1998).
1, Halligan died before the arbitration was concluded, and his widow continued the
arbitration. Halligan, 148 F.3d at 198.
32 For example, Halligan testified at the hearing that Tad Piper, the CEO of the firm,
had told him "you're too old. Our clients are young and they want young salesmen,'
and that Bruce Huber, his supervisor, told him 'we want you out of here quickly.' Id.
Piper and Huber denied making such remarks. Id. A former client of Halligan testified
that Huber said that Halligan "would get put out to pasture because he was getting
old.' Id. at 199.
33 Id. at 198-99.
m Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at 1.
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dence.3 The Second Circuit reversed, holding that the arbitrators'
denial of any relief to Halligan constituted manifest disregard of the
law. The court distinguished DiRussa, which had been decided
about a year earlier,36 on the ground that in Halligan counsel for
both parties agreed on the applicable law and explained it to the
arbitrators. In view of this and the "strong evidence that Halligan
was fired because of his age," the court stated, in peculiarly hesitant
language: "we are inclined to hold that they ignored the law or the
evidence or both."37
The Second Circuit noted that the Supreme Court had previous-
ly upheld the arbitrability of an ADEA discrimination claim on the
assumption that the claimant would not forgo the substantive rights
afforded by the statute, stating: "This case puts those assumptions to
the test." 38 Departing from precedent, the court heavily stressed
the fact that the arbitrators, following the usual custom in arbitra-
tions, did not write an opinion explaining their conclusions. 9
While conceding that arbitrators are under no obligation to write
opinions, the court said:
where a reviewing court is inclined to find that arbitrators manifestly
disregarded the law or the evidence and that an explanation, if given,
would have strained credulity, the absence of explanation may reinforce
the reviewing court's confidence that the arbitrators engaged in manifest
disregard.4"
It is not clear whether the court intended the above-quoted lan-
guage to apply only to the review of arbitration awards in discrimi-
nation cases, to arbitration awards in statutory claims, or to all
arbitration awards.
The Halligan court did not clearly identify the law that it be-
lieved the arbitrators disregarded. The Second Circuit's opinion
suggests that it believed that the arbitrators disregarded the applica-
1s Halligan v. Piper Jaffray, Inc., No. 96 Civ. 4472, 1997 WL 181028 (S.D.N.Y. Apr.
15, 1997), rev'd, 148 F.3d 197 (2d Cir. 1998).
36 DiRussa was decided in the Second Circuit on August 5, 1997, and Halligan on
July 9, 1998.
17 Halligan, 148 F.3d at 204 (emphasis added).
Id. (citing Gilmer v. Interstate/ohnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991)).
3' The American Arbitration Association (AAA") discourages its arbitrators from writ-
ing opinions for the very reason that, if arbitrators explained the rationale for their deci-
sions, this could provide the losing party with grounds for seeking judicial review of
awards. AAA, A GUIDE FOR SECURmEs ARBITRATORS SERVING UNDER THE AAA'S SECURMES
ARBITRATION RULES 32-33 (1993).
o Halligan, 148 F.3d at 204.
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ble law as to the burden of proof in an ADEA case, but the Halligan
court made no attempt to demonstrate, as prior Second Circuit
precedents require, that the disregarded law was "well defined,
explicit, and clearly applicable."41
In fact, the law governing the burden of proof in cases brought
under the ADEA is far more complex than the relatively simple
question that was at issue in DiRussa: whether a prevailing party
was entitled to attorneys' fees. Most courts, including the Second
Circuit, have applied to ADEA cases the burden-of-proof formula
that the Supreme Court established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green,42 Texas Dep't. of Community Affairs v. Burdine,43 and St.
Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks,44 for cases brought under Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.4s Under that formula, an employee
must plead and prove four elements in order to establish a prima
facie case: (1) the employee was a member of a protected class (in
the case of age discrimination, over forty years of age); (2) the em-
ployee was qualified for the job; (3) the employee was adversely
affected by the employer's action; and (4) the employer continued
to seek someone with qualifications similar to those that the em-
41 See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Bobker, 808 F.2d 930, 934 (2d
Cir. 1986). Halligan argued before the district court that the arbitrators manifestly disre-
garded the rule that, once Halligan had introduced direct evidence of discrimination,
Piper bore the burden of proof that his claim was without merit and that Piper had not
met its burden of proof. The district court rejected this argument on the ground that
"the record of the arbitration proceedings does not indicate the Panel's awareness, prior
to its determinations, of the standards for burdens of proof.' 1997 WL 181028, at *3.
The Second Circuit made the following comment on the district court's statement:
The record indicates that counsel for both parties generally agreed on the
applicable law (and still do on appeal), and explained it to the arbitrators. It is
true that the district court stated that the record "does not indicate the Panel's
awareness, prior to its determinations, of the standard for burden of proof.' If
this observation meant that counsel did not explain the law sufficiently to the
arbitrators, it is not correct. Perhaps the district court meant that the arbitrators
did not state that they were ignoring the relevant standards for burdens of
proof. That is true, but we doubt whether, even under a strict construction of
manifest disregard, it is necessary for arbitrators to state that they are deliber-
ately ignoring the law.
148 F.3d at 204.
42 411 U.S. 792 (1973). In Bay v. Times Mirror Magazines, Inc., 936 F.2d 112 (2d
Cir. 1991), the court applied the McDonnell Douglas analysis in an ADEA case. Accord
DeNovellis v. Shalala, 124 F.3d 298 (3d Cir. 1997); Rothmeier v. Investment Advisors,
Inc., 85 F.3d 1328 (8th Cir. 1996); Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003 (1st Cir.
1979).
4' 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
509 U.S. 502 (1993).
41 42 U.S.C. §2000e et seq. (1994).
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ployee possessed.4" If the employee establishes a prima facie case,
the burden of production shifts to the employer to articulate some
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's termination
sufficient to raise a genuine issue of fact as to whether it discrimi-
nated against the employee.47 If the employer carries this burden,
the presumption of discrimination "simply drops out of the picture,"
and the employee must then prove that the employer intentionally
discriminated against him. The burden of production then shifts
back to the employee to show that the employer's explanation was
not the true reason for the employment decision. The Court stated
in Hicks:
At the close of the defendant's case, the court is asked to decide whether
an issue of fact remains for the trier of fact to determine. None does if, on
the evidence presented, (1) any rational person would have to find the
existence of facts constituting a prima facie case, and (2) the defendant
has failed to meet its burden of production-i.e., has failed to introduce
evidence which, taken as true, would permit the conclusion that there
was a nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse action. In that event, the
court must award judgment to the plaintiff as a matter of law.... If the
defendant has failed to sustain its burden but reasonable minds could
differ as to whether a preponderance of the evidence establishes the facts
of a prima facie case, then a question of fact does remain, which the trier
of fact will be called upon to answer.48
Although the burden of production shifts back and forth, the ulti-
mate burden of persuasion rests on the employee to prove that the
employer intentionally discriminated against him.49
46 Applying the fourth prong of the McDonnell Douglas test to ADEA cases has
caused problems for the courts, because this prong has often been interpreted to require
that the employer had given the job to someone outside the protected class. In an
ADEA case, this would mean that an employee who was fired could not establish a
prima facie case of age discrimination unless the employer gave his job to a person of
under forty years of age. In O'Connor v. Consol. Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308
(1996), the Supreme Court held that in an ADEA case it is not necessary for the
plaintiff to show that the person hired to replace him was under forty, only that the
replacement was substantially younger than the plaintiff. Id. at 312-13.
The arbitrators' decision in Halligan was made on March 19, 1995, before the
O'Connor decision, which was made on April 1, 1996. It is possible, therefore, that
the arbitrators denied any relief to Halligan because they did not believe that he had
established the fourth prong of the McDonnell Douglas test. Since the law on this point
was not clear until the Supreme Court clarified it in O'Connor, the arbitrators' decision,
even if it was erroneous, did not constitute manifest disregard under existing precedents.
47 McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
' hicks, 509 U.S. at 509-10.
41 Id. at 507; see also Chisolm v. Kidder, Peabody Asset Management, Inc., 966 F.
Supp. 218, 228 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), aff'd, No. 97-7828, 1998 WL 695041 (2d Cir. July 28,
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It should be apparent from the above that the law applicable to
proving age discrimination is complex and lacks that crystalline
clarity that the Second Circuit has in the past regarded as essential
for vacatur based on manifest disregard of the law."0 Furthermore,
it is by no means clear that the arbitrators in Halligan disregarded
this law when they denied any recovery to the claimant. For exam-
ple, they may have believed that the claimant was unable to estab-
lish a prima facie case, that the respondents had successfully rebut-
ted the plaintiff's prima facie case, or that the claimant had failed to
meet its ultimate burden of persuasion.
Although the Second Circuit ostensibly based its vacatur of the
award on the ground of manifest disregard, it seems more likely that
the court believed that the arbitrators' denial of recovery to the
claimant was contrary to the weight of the evidence."s If the same
case had been heard by a judge and jury instead of by arbitrators,
and the jury had rendered a verdict for the defendant, the trial court
might have granted the plaintiff a judgment notwithstanding the
verdict on the ground that no reasonable jury could have found in
the defendant's favor.52 Under the prevailing interpretation of the
FAA, however, a court is not permitted to vacate an award simply
because the arbitrators made erroneous findings of fact or law. 3
1998) (unpublished opinion) (citing McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802).
o See Kenneth R. Davis, The Stumbling Three-Step, Burden-Shifting Approach in
Employment Discrimination Cases, 61 BROOK. L. REv. 703 (1995). It is an indication of
the complexity of the law in this area that Hicks was decided by a 5-4 majority of the
Court and that in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (another leading
case on the question of the requisite burden of proof in Title VII cases), the Justices
wrote four separate opinions covering 65 pages of the U.S. REPORTS: Justice Brennan
wrote the opinion of the Court; Justices O'Connor and White wrote separate concurring
opinions; and Justice Kennedy wrote a dissenting opinion.
st The district court stated: 'There is support for [Piper's] argument in the record, al-
though there is also support for [Halligan's] claim. Determining the credibility of conflict-
ing witnesses is a key component of an arbitration panel's duty, and crediting one wit-
ness over another does not constitute manifest disregard of the law." Halligan v. Piper
Jaffray, Inc., No. 96 Civ. 4472, 1997 WL 181028, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 15, 1997),
rev'd, 148 F.3d 197 (2d Cir. 1998).
2 Under Rule 50 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, if "there is no legally
sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury' to decide an issue in a party's favor,
the trial judge
may determine the issue against that party and may grant a motion for judg-
ment as a matter of law against that party with respect to a claim or defense
that cannot under the controlling law be maintained or defeated without a
favorable finding on that issue.
FED. R. Civ. P. 50.
s1 See Miller v. Prudential Bache Sec., Inc., 884 F.2d 128, 130-31 (4th Cir. 1989);
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Although the court paid lip service to the manifest disregard stan-
dard, it appears to have based its decision on the premise that, if
the same case had been tried in a federal court, the plaintiff would
have prevailed, and that a claimant asserting a statutory right should
not be deprived of that right because he has submitted the matter to
arbitration.
!1. ARBITRABILITY OF EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENTS
As litigation becomes more expensive and time-consuming, it
has become increasingly common for parties to enter into agree-
ments to arbitrate any future disputes that may arise between them.
Arbitration is supposed to be cheaper, faster, less disruptive, and
more flexible than litigation. 4 It is well established today that
agreements to arbitrate future disputes are generally enforceable.
The FAA"5 makes arbitration agreements involving interstate com-
merce as enforceable as other contracts, and many states have simi-
lar statutes.56 The Supreme Court has declared that the FAA is a
"congressional declaration of a liberal federal policy favoring arbi-
tration agreements.""' To implement this policy, the federal courts
give a generous interpretation to such agreements: any doubts con-
cerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of
arbitration.5 8 Moreover, in the securities industry, arbitration has
become the preferred method by which brokerage firms resolve
disputes with their customers and with their employees.5 9
The first question raised by DiRussa and Halligan is whether
the FAA requires enforcement of an employee's agreement to arbi-
trate future disputes. The overriding purpose of the FAA, which was
enacted in 1925, was to overcome the traditional hostility of the
French v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 784 F.2d 902, 906 (9th Cir.
1986).
" See Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 280 (1995) (quot-
ing H.R. REP. No. 97-542, at 13 (1982)).
11 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (1994).
5' See, e.g., CAL CIV. PROC. CODE § 1281 (West 1982); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 682.02
(West 1998); 710 ILL COMP. STAT. 5/1 (West 1992); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 7501-14 (McKinney
1986); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7303 (1982); TEx. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN.
§ 171.001 (West 1997).
"I Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Const. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983).
s8 Id. at 24-25.
59 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL REQUESTERS, EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION: How REGISTERED REPRESENTATIVES FARE IN DISCRIMINATION DISPUTES, Pub.
No. GAO/HEHS-94-17, 57 (1994) (hereinafter GAO Discrimination Report).
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courts to arbitration.6" The FAA extends to all arbitration agree-
ments that come within the full reach of the Commerce Clause of
the Constitution.6'
The broad congressional policy favoring arbitration is, however,
subject to one important qualification. By its terms, section 1 of the
FAA provides that the statute does not apply to "contracts of em-
ployment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of
workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce." Although the
Supreme Court has never construed this exclusionary clause, the
lower federal courts have given it a narrow interpretation. Employ-
ing the canon of statutory or contractual construction known as
ejusdem generis ("of the same kind"), the courts have interpreted
the general term "any other class of workers" as being restricted by
the more specific language that precedes it: i.e., to workers em-
ployed in interstate commerce like sailors and railway workers.62
Thus, the circuit courts that have considered the question have held
that the exclusion is restricted to workers actually engaged in the
movement of goods in interstate commerce. 3 The courts have sup-
60 See Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 270-71.
61 Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 490 (1987).
62 See Rojas v. TK Communications, Inc., 87 F.3d 745, 748 (5th Cir. 1996);
Asplundh Tree Expert Co. v. Bates, 71 F.3d 592, 598 (6th Cir. 1995); Signal-Stat Corp.
v. Local 475, United Elec., Radio and Mach. Workers of Am., 235 F.2d 298 (2d Cir.
1956); Tenney Eng'g, Inc. v. United Elec. Radio & Mach. Workers of Am., 207 F.2d
450, 452 (3d Cir. 1953). See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Reconsidering the Employment Con-
tract Exclusion in Section 1 of the Federal Arbitration Act! Correcting the judiciary's
Failure of Statutory Vision, 1991 J. DISP. RESOL 259, for a comprehensive discussion of
the exclusionary clause.
I See Cole v. Bums Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1471 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
('[E]very circuit to consider this issue squarely has found that section 1 of the FAA ex-
empts only the employment contracts of workers actually engaged in the movement of
goods in interstate commerce.'). In Cole, the court based a narrow reading of the
exclusionary clause on the rule of ejusdem generis ('of the same kind') and also on the
canon of statutory interpretation that a statute should be construed to give a meaning to
every word. Id. at 1470-71. If the words "any other class of workers engaged in foreign
or interstate commerce' . . . extended to all workers whose jobs have any effect on
commerce, the specific inclusion of seamen and railroad workers would have been
unnecessary.' Id. at 1470. See generally Paladino v. Avnet Computer Tech., 134 F.3d
1054, 1060-61 (11th Cir. 1998). Paladino states that all but one of the circuit courts
have construed the exclusionary clause narrowly. Id. (Cox, J., concurring). The single
dissenting court was apparently the Fourth Circuit. See United Elec. Radio & Mach.
Workers of Am. v. Miller Metal Prods., Inc., 215 F.2d 221, 224 (4th Cir. 1954). Howev-
er, in view of subsequent Supreme Court decisions favoring arbitration, Miller no longer
has any force. See O'Neil v. Hilton Head Hosp., 115 F.3d 272, 274 & n.1 (4th Cir.
1997). In Willis v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 948 F.2d 305, 311-12 (6th Cir. 1991),
the court found that the exclusionary clause covered all employment contracts. However,
19981
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ported this statutory interpretation, which seems inconsistent with
the plain language of the statute, with various arguments. Some
courts have reasoned that the strong federal policy in favor of arbi-
tration requires a narrow reading of the exclusion for employment
contracts.6 4 Other courts have suggested that the term "workers"
refers only to blue-collar employees and does not include salesmen
and others with managerial responsibilities," or that persons such
as stockbrokers who do not physically transport goods across state
lines are not engaged in interstate commerce.66
Two strong arguments can be made, however, against a narrow
construction of the exclusionary clause. First, it is anomalous to
interpret the term "interstate commerce" in a radically different way
in two sections of the same statute. Section 2 of the FAA, which
contains the basic operative language of the statute, provides that an
arbitration agreement "evidencing a transaction involving [interstate]
commerce" shall be enforceable to the same extent as any other
contract.67 As stated earlier, the Supreme Court has held that this
provision should be given a broad interpretation, which extends the
reach of the FAA to the limits of the Commerce Clause of the Con-
stitution.68 On the other hand, section 1, which expressly excludes
employment contracts of workers engaged in interstate commerce
in Asplundh, the Sixth Circuit declined to follow Willis, on the ground that its broad
interpretation of the exclusionary clause was dictum. 71 F.3d at 596-97.
In 1993, the New York Court of Appeals stated: "A majority of the lower Federal
courts that have considered the issue have held that the exclusion . . . extends to em-
ployment contracts in all industries.' Fletcher v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., Inc., 619
N.E.2d 998, 1005 (N.Y. 1993) (citing Willis). This statement appears to have been
incorrect when it was made and is clearly incorrect today.
I See, e.g., O'Neil, 115 F.3d at 274.
11 See, e.g., Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., Inc., 218 F.2d 948, 951-52 (2d
Cir. 1955), rev'd on other grounds, 350 U.S. 198 (1956).
6 See, e.g., Dickstein v. DuPont, 443 F.2d 783, 785 (1st Cir. 1971). Professor
Stempel points out the absurdity of this position:
[l"he broker who uses a long distance phone and the mail to consummate the
sale of $100,000 of federally regulated securities from a California buyer to a
New York seller is not engaged in interstate commerce because she does not
engage in physical movement of items across state lines. However, the letter
carrier who lives in Lincoln, Nebraska, picks up mail at the central post office
there, and then delivers it in a residential area of Lincoln is a worker engaged
in interstate commerce.
Stempel, supra note 62, at 289.
67 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1994).
6 See Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 490 (1987); see also Allied-Bruce Terminix
Cos., Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 274 (1995).
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from the reach of the FAA, has been interpreted much more narrow-
ly, so as to include only workers engaged in the physical
transportation of goods across state lines.
Second, the legislative history of the FAA's exclusionary clause,
while sparse, suggests that Congress intended to make arbitration
agreements between merchants enforceable but not to extend the
reach of the statute to labor disputes or employment contracts. At
the time of the enactment of the FAA, members of various industries
"supported industry-wide agreements to arbitrate because of the
speed, economy, privacy, and finality of arbitration, and also the
knowledge that disputes would be decided by representative indi-
viduals in the industry who could be expected to know far more
about the particular industry than laypersons selected haphazardly
as jurors in court cases." 9 It does not appear, however, that Con-
gress intended the Act to apply to contracts of employment. The
employment exclusion was first suggested in the course of Senate
hearings on the bill that became the FAA. The following dialogue
took place between Mr. Piatt, who represented the committee of the
American Bar Association that had drafted the bill, and Senators
Sterling and Walsh:
Mr. Piatt: [There is [a] matfer I should call to your attention. Since
you introduced this bill there has been an objection raised against it that I
think should be met here, to wit, the official head, or whatever he is, of
that part of the labor union that has to do with the ocean-the seamen-
Sen. Sterling: Mr. Furuseth?
Mr. Piatt: Yes, some such name as that. He has objected to it, and
criticized it on the ground that the bill in its present form would affect, in
fact compel, arbitration of the matters of agreement between the steve-
dores and their employers. Now, it was not the intention of the bill to
have any such effect as that. It was not the intention of this bill to make
an industrial arbitration in any sense; and so I suggest that in as far as the
committee is concerned, if your honorable committee should feel that
there is any danger of that, they should add to the bill the following lan-
guage, Obut nothing herein contained shall apply to seamen or any class
of workers in interstate and foreign commerce.' It is not intended that this
shall be an act referring to labor disputes at all. It is purely an act to give
the merchants the right or the privilege of sitting down and agreeing with
each other as to what their damages are, if they want to do it. Now, that
is all there is to this.
Sen. Walsh: This has occurred to me. I see no reason at all-I see
none now; there may be some reason but I see no reason now-why,
" Norman S. Poser, When ADR Eclipses Litigation: The Brave New World of Securi-
ties Arbitration, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 1095, 1095-96 (1993).
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when two men voluntarily agree to submit their controversy to arbitration,
they should not be compelled to have it decided that way.
Mr. Piatt: Yes, sir.
Sen. Walsh: The trouble about the matter is that a great many of
these contracts that are entered into are really not voluntary at all.7
The concern expressed by Senator Walsh as to the
voluntariness of employment contracts applies fully to DiRussa's
and Halligan's situations. Their decisions to arbitrate their age dis-
crimination claims, rather than to bring lawsuits in federal court,
were not voluntary in any meaningful sense since they were re-
quired to sign arbitration agreements as a condition of employment
in the securities industry. However, even if the FAA's exclusionary
clause could be construed to cover stockbrokers' employment
agreements, it is not clear that DiRussa and Halligan's obligation to
arbitrate was based on an employment agreement. It was based on
a written application that they were required to complete with the
NYSE and the NASD (of which their employers were members)
when they applied for employment. The Securities Exchange Act of
1934 (the "1934 Act") requires virtually all broker-dealers to be
members of the NASD,71 and most large broker-dealer firms
choose also to be member firms of the NYSE. Under the rules of
these two self-regulatory organizations ("SROs"), any dispute be-
tween a member firm and an "associated person," arising out of the
associated person's employment or termination of employment,
must be arbitrated if either party demands arbitration." The term
"associated person" includes any person who is engaged in the
investment banking or securities business on behalf of a member
firm of the NASD or NYSE and is therefore required by the rules of
the organization to apply to be registered with it." As so-called
"registered representatives," DiRussa and Halligan were required by
NASD and NYSE rules to sign the Uniform Application for Securi-
70 Hearings on Sales and Contracts to Sell in Interstate and Foreign Commerce, and
Federal Commercial Arbitration, Before the Senate Comm. of the Judiciary, 67th Cong. 9
(1923) (emphasis added).
71 15 U.S.C. § 780(b)(8) (1994) requires that any broker-dealer that has dealings in
securities, other than in commercial paper and similar instruments, not on a stock ex-
change of which it is a member must be a member of a registered national securities
association. The NASD is the only such association that has ever been registered with
the SEC.
7 NYSE Const. art. Xl, § 1; NYSE RuEs 600(a), 347; NASD RuLEs 10101(b),
10201 (a).
's NASD Bylaws art. I(q); NYSE RuLE 10.
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ties Industry Registration or Transfer. This application form, which is
designated as Form U-4, includes the following provision:
I agree to arbitrate any dispute, claim or controversy that may arise be-
tween me or my firm, or a customer, or any other person, that is required
to be arbitrated under the rules, constitutions, or bylaws of the organiza-
tions with which I register... as may be amended from time to time and
that any arbitration award rendered against me may be entered as a judg-
ment in any court of competent jurisdiction. 4
By signing the Form U-4, registered employees such as DiRussa
and Halligan agree to be bound by the arbitration provisions of the
SRO, even if they do not sign an employment agreement containing
an arbitration clause with the member firm that employs them. It
can therefore be argued that the obligation of a registered employee
to arbitrate disputes with his or her employer does not fall within
the FAA's employment exclusion because the obligation to arbitrate
is based on the application to register with the SRO as a broker and
the agreement to be bound by the rules of the SRO, not on any
agreement with the employer.7' Alternatively, the employer may
be able to enforce the arbitration clause in the Form U-4 on the
ground that the employer is a third-party beneficiary of the
agreement between the registered employee and the SRO.76
In Gilmer v. InterstatelJohnson Lane Corp.,77 which like the
DiRussa and Halligan cases involved a brokerage-firm employee's
claim against his employer under the ADEA, the Supreme Court
declined to consider the question whether the exclusionary clause
of the FAA excludes from the coverage of the FAA all "contracts of
employment" or only contracts of workers in the transportation in-
dustries. The Court concluded that the exclusionary clause did not
apply to Gilmer's arbitration agreement because it was contained
74 NYSE RULE 345.12; NASD RULE 1140(c).
7' Metz v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 39 F.3d 1482, 1488 (10th
Cir. 1994); Schooley v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 867 F. Supp. 989,
991-92 (W.D. Okla. 1994). The requirement of the NASD and NYSE that a member-firm
employee sign the Form U-4 is not an unconstitutional condition of employment. Illyes
v. John Nuveen & Co., Inc., 949 F. Supp. 580, 583-84 (N.D. III. 1996).
76 Stone v. Pennsylvania Merchant Group, Ltd., 949 F.Supp. 316 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
" 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
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not in an employment agreement with the firm but in the Form U-4
registration application.78 As Professor Jeffrey Stempel has pointed
out, Gilmer's employer
gets to enforce the arbitration clause of a contract it did not sign but
Gilmer is not permitted to invoke a statutory exclusion based on that
same contract. [This result] seems grossly unfair by modem standards. At a
minimum, it is a clear victory for formalism over functionalism and
equity."
Compulsory arbitration of employment-related disputes is a
cause for concern. Under the FAA, the basis for compelling arbitra-
tion is that the parties have voluntarily agreed to arbitrate and that
arbitration agreements should be enforced to the same extent as
other contracts. However, the fact that employment by a brokerage
firm as a registered representative is conditioned on the employee's
signing a Form U-4 means that the agreement can hardly be consid-
ered a voluntary one in any meaningful sense of the word.8" Al-
though the use by brokerage firms of standard-form customer agree-
ments containing an arbitration clause raises the question of wheth-
er the customer freely gave his informed consent to the agreement,
the element of coercion is much more palpable for an employee
than it is for an investor.81 An investor may be able to find a bro-
kerage firm that does not require an arbitration agreement or, in any
case, may make investments without using a brokerage firm; but a
person who wishes to make his living in the securities industry has
no choice but to agree to arbitrate future disputes. The courts have
given scant attention to these considerations in their eagerness to
compel arbitration.
7 Id. at 25 n.2.
79 Stempel, supra note 62, at 277.
'8 This observation of course applies to the arbitration of any employment dispute,
not just disputes involving claims of discrimination. However, the New York Court of
Appeals has pointed out that in several recent federal decisions 'the arbitration agree-
ment contained in the U-4 Form was enforced even though the agreement had been
signed as a condition to becoming a registered representative and a refusal to sign
would have meant exclusion from the industry." Fletcher v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., Inc.,
619 N.E.2d 998, 1004 (N.Y. 1993).
"1 In ShearsonlAmerican Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987), the Su-
preme Court held that an agreement between a brokerage firm and a customer to arbi-
trate future disputes, including claims arising under the 1934 Act, was enforceable.
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III. ARBITRATION OF DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS
DiRussa and Halligan's claims were not ordinary employment
disputes. They were claims based on violations of a federal statute
that specifically gives employees redress for discrimination based on
age. Compulsory arbitration of such claims raises public policy and
practical concerns that are not present in run-of-the-mill brokerage-
firm employment disputes such as those involving wrongful dis-
charge, disagreements over commissions or other compensation, or
solicitation of a firm's customers by a former employee in violation
of an employment agreement. Arbitrators who are capable of resolv-
ing employment disputes may not have the necessary competence
to deal with discrimination claims.82 Many NYSE and NASD arbi-
trators are not lawyers, let alone lawyers with expertise in enforce-
ment of anti-discrimination statutes. Beyond the question of techni-
cal competence, the arbitrators, who are selected by securities-in-
dustry organizations (i.e., organizations whose members are the
employers), may lack the insight, experience, and empathy to fully
understand discrimination claims. As the United States General
Accounting Office has reported, the panels that arbitrate discrimi-
nation cases have little racial or sexual diversity, being composed
principally of white males, averaging sixty years of age, who receive
little or no training in the discrimination laws.83
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court's uncritical policy favoring the
enforcement of arbitration agreements extends to discrimination
02 See infra Part IV.
See GAO Discrimination Report, supra note 59, at 8-9; Margaret A. Jacobs, Little
Diversity Found on Panels For Securities-Firm Arbitration, WALL ST. J., Apr. 1, 1994, at
B3. Several months after the GAO Report was published, the Wall Street Journal report-
ed that the NASD and NYSE had responded to the criticism by increasing the number
of arbitrators receiving training in discrimination law and by stepping up efforts to recruit
arbitrators with diverse backgrounds. Margaret A. Jacobs, Judges Appear to be Growing
Skeptical of Arbitration, WALL ST. J., Dec. 22, 1994, at B2 [hereinafter Judges Appear]
Arbitration panels composed primarily of elderly white males may well be favorably
disposed to claimants in ADEA cases. Nevertheless, the problems with compulsory arbi-
tration in this area have been summarized as follows:
Those with grievances and their representatives say the industry picks its arbi-
trators from a Wall Street "old boy' network that is especially unlikely to look
favorably on discrimination claims, requires little-to-no knowledge of employ-
ment law, conducts its operations in secret and explicitly tells its mediators
they neither have to follow the law nor explain their decisions.




claims. In Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.84 the Court held
that an employee of a brokerage firm must arbitrate a claim against
the firm based on federally prohibited age discrimination. Gilmer is
perhaps the most extreme example of the Court's adherence to what
one writer has justifiably called "a doctrine of absolute deference to
arbitrability-regardless of subject matter.""5 In Gilmer, a former
executive of an NYSE member firm filed suit in a federal district
court against the firm under the ADEA,8" charging that the firm had
terminated his employment because of his age.87 The firm filed a
motion to compel arbitration on the ground that Gilmer had agreed
to arbitrate any future employment-related disputes when he signed
the registration application on a Form U-4. The Supreme Court
held, by a 7-2 majority,88 that claims under the ADEA were
arbitrable.
The Court's opinion in Gilmer consisted largely of citing its
previous decisions that upheld arbitration agreements and that gave
a broad interpretation to the FAA. Thus, the court stated at the
outset: "It is by now clear that statutory claims may be the subject
of an arbitration agreement, enforceable pursuant to the FAA" and
recited that in recent years it had held enforceable agreements to
arbitrate claims under the Sherman Antitrust Act, the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations ("RICO") statute, the Securi-
ties Act of 1933, and the 1934 Act.89 Conceding that the ADEA is
designed not only to address individual grievances but also to ad-
dress important social policies, the Court cited Mitsubishi Motors
Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.,' in which it had upheld
the arbitrability of a claim under the antitrust laws, to support the
view that there is no inherent inconsistency between these policies
and enforcing agreements to arbitrate age discrimination claims.91
Similarly, the Court, refuting Gilmer's argument that arbitration
would undermine the role of the EEOC in enforcing the ADEA,
500 U.S. 20 (1991).
J ay R. Sever, The Relaxation of Inarbitrability and Public Policy Checks on U.S.
and Foreign Arbitration: Arbitration Out of Control?, 65 TUL L. REv. 1661, 1672 (1991).
86 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. (1985).
87 Before bringing suit, Gilmer filed an age discrimination charge with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOCI). Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 23.
8 Justice White wrote the majority's opinion. Justice Stevens wrote a dissent, which
was joined by Justice Marshall. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 22.
Id. at 26.
90 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
11 Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 27-28.
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cited the Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon92 and Ro-
driguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc.93  In
McMahon and Rodrigues de Quijas, the Court upheld where it
upheld agreements to arbitrate claims arising under the federal
securities statutes notwithstanding the important role played by the
Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") in enforcing these
laws, as support for its ruling that "the mere involvement of an ad-
ministrative agency in the enforcement of a statute is not sufficient
to preclude arbitration."94 The Court found nothing in the ADEA to
indicate that Congress intended to preclude arbitration; in fact, the
ADEA's "flexible approach to resolution of claims," including con-
ciliation, conference, and persuasion, suggests that arbitration is
consistent with the statutory scheme of the ADEA 5
The Court also rejected Gilmer's challenges to NYSE arbitration
procedures:
[I]n our recent arbitration cases we have already rejected most of these
arguments as insufficient to preclude arbitration of statutory claims. Such
generalized attacks on arbitration "res[t] on suspicion of arbitration as a
method of weakening the protections afforded in the substantive law to
would-be complainants," and as such, they are "far out of step with our
current strong endorsement of the federal statutes favoring this method of
resolving disputes.""
In particular, the Court dismissed Gilmer's assertion that NYSE
arbitration panels would be biased, that the limits on discovery
would make it more difficult to prove discrimination, that the ab-
sence of opinions by the arbitrators would result in a lack of public
knowledge of employers' discriminatory policies, and that arbitra-
tion procedures do not provide for broad equitable relief and class
actions.97 The Court also cited its opinions in McMahon and Rodri-
guez de Quijas to support the proposition that inequality in bargain-
ing power, absent a showing of coercion or fraud, is not a sufficient
reason to refuse to enforce arbitration agreements in the
employment context.98
92 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
91 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 28-29.
91 Id. at 29.
96 Id. at 30 (quoting Rodriguez de Quijas, 490 U.S. at 481).




Emboldened by the Supreme Court's uncritical attitude toward
arbitration, hundreds of employers in many industries have inserted
mandatory arbitration clauses in standard contracts with employ-
ees, 99 and the courts have interpreted Gilmer to cover other types
of discrimination claims. Following Gilmer, several lower federal
courts have held that claims of race and sex discrimination made by
employees or former employees of brokerage firms against the firms
pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964'00 are arbitra-
ble2 1 Similarly, an employee's claim that a brokerage firm fired
him for taking time off in order to serve as a juror, in violation of
the federal Jurors' Act, 2 was held to be arbitrable. 3 The New
York Court of Appeals has held that the FAA, as interpreted by the
U.S. Supreme Court in Gilmer, requires the arbitration of race and
sex discrimination claims brought under state law by registered
employees of securities firms."
The SRO rules that force all employment discrimination suits,
including those based on race and sex as well as on age, into arbi-
tration have received a lot of unfavorable public attention.' A
number of sex-discrimination suits by employees against brokerage
" Jacobs, Judges Appear, supra note 83, at B2. Interestingly, the AAA has indicated
that it will refuse to administer mandatory arbitrations of patients' disputes with health-
care providers. Margaret A. Jacobs, American Arbitration Association To Change Policy
on Health Care, WALL ST. J., July 1, 1998, at B5.
'00 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (1994).
10! See, e.g., Metz v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 39 F.3d 1482 (10th
Cir. 1994) (claim of sex discrimination is arbitrable); Kidd v. Equitable Life Assurance
Soc'y of the U.S., 32 F.3d 516 (11th Cir. 1994), appeal after remand, 119 F.3d 11,
cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 626 (1997) (race discrimination); Alford v. Dean Witter
Reynolds, Inc., 975 F.2d 1161 (5th Cir. 1992); Bender v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc.,
971 F.2d 698 (11th Cir. 1992); Willis v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 948 F.2d 305 (6th
Cir. 1991); Satarino v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 941 F. Supp. 609 (N.D. Tex. 1996)(Americans with Disabilities Act); see also Ludwig v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of
the U.S., 978 F. Supp. 1379 (D. Kan. 1997) (rejecting employee's argument that arbitra-
tion agreement was not valid because she did not know she was forgoing her right to
sue in federal court).
102 28 U.S.C. § 1875 (1994).
10 McNulty v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 871 F. Supp. 567 (E.D.N.Y. 1994).
'o See Fletcher v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., Inc., 619 N.E.2d 998 (N.Y. 1993). The
New York Court of Appeals found that Gilmer required it to overrule its earlier decision
in Matter of Wertheim & Co. v. Halpert, 397 N.E.2d 386 (N.Y. 1979), where it had
held that pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate discrimination claims were unenforceable
'because of the strong public policies embodied in Federal, State and local
antidiscrimination laws.' Fletcher, 619 N.E.2d at 1000.
10" Patrick McGeehan, Bias Panel Is Formed By NASD, WALL ST. j., May 29, 1997,
at C1.
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firms have reinforced an image of the securities industry as "a male
bastion hostile to women."0 6 Meanwhile, the Chairman of the
Securities and Exchange Commission, the New York Attorney Gen-
eral, the American Arbitration Association, and other groups have
exerted pressure on the securities industry to replace mandatory
arbitration of employment disputes with a voluntary arbitration
system.' O°
Courts, regulators, and even brokerage firms themselves, appar-
ently responding to such criticism and pressure, have begun to
place some limits on compelling brokerage-firm employees to arbi-
trate discrimination claims. Two Ninth Circuit decisions are par-
ticularly significant. In Prudential Insurance Co. v. Lai,"°8 two fe-
male sales representatives of Prudential brought an action against
Prudential and their immediate supervisor in a California state court
on a variety of state-law claims, alleging that the supervisor had
raped, harassed, and sexually abused them. Relying on the Gilmer
holding, the firm moved in federal district court to compel arbitra-
tion, since the plaintiffs had signed Form U-4s containing arbitration
agreements. °9
The Ninth Circuit found in the employees' favor, holding that,
even after the Gilmer decision, "employees cannot be bound by an
agreement to arbitrate employment discrimination claims unless
they knowingly agreed to arbitrate such claims.""' On the basis of
the plaintiffs' allegations, they did not knowingly agree to arbitrate
because of the following alleged factual circumstances: when they
signed the Form U-4, they were told only that they were applying
106 Patrick McGeehan, Smith Barney Moves Toward Sex-Bias Accord, WALL ST. J.,
Aug. 19, 1997, at Cl.
107 See Patrick McGeehan, Smith Barney Diversity Plan Represents a Major Leap for
Women on Wall Street, WALL ST. J., Nov. 19, 1997, at B2; Voluntary Arbitration In
Worker Disputes Endorsed by 2 Groups, WALL ST. J., June 20, 1997, at B2. The Report
of the Ruder Committee, published by the NASD in 1996, commented:
The requirement that employees arbitrate employment related disputes, especial-
ly claims arising from federal anti-discrimination statutes, has been criticized in
many arenas. Labor representatives, academics, federal agencies and commis-
sions, members of Congress, and the press have criticized various aspects of
compulsory employment arbitration.
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURmES DEALERS, INC., SECURmES ARBITRATION REFORM: RE-
PORT OF THE ARBITRATION PoUcy TASK FORCE TO THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS, at 115-16
(1996) [hereinafter Ruder Report].
'ce 42 F.3d 1299 (9th Cir. 1994).
1'9 Id. at 1301.
110 Id. at 1304.
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to take a test which Prudential required for their employment; they
were told to sign the forms without being given an opportunity to
read them; arbitration was never mentioned to them; and they were
not given a copy of the NASD Manual, which contains the terms of
the arbitration agreement.11'
In Duffield v. Robertson Stephens & Co., 112 the Ninth Circuit
took an additional step beyond its decision in Lai, holding that the
compulsory arbitration provision of the Form U-4 was unenforce-
able as applied to Title VII claims. The court based its decision
largely on its reading of the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act
of 1991, which indicated that Congress did not intend that a person
could waive his or her right to bring Title VII claims in court.'13
While recognizing that the general federal policy in favor of arbitra-
tion would ordinarily apply to the compulsory arbitration of civil
rights claims, the court stated that, in view of the manifest intent of
Congress, it was not free to apply the pro-arbitration policy to a
Title VII claim.11
4
Similarly, a Massachusetts district court recently decided that a
brokerage-firm employee could bring a sex discrimination claim
"I Id. at 1301. In an unpublished opinion, a divided panel of the Sixth Circuit held
that a sexual harassment claim brought under Title VII by an employee of a brokerage-
firm was arbitrable. Cosgrove v. Shearson Lehman Brothers, 105 F.3d 659, 1997 WL
4783 (6th Cir.) (unpublished decision), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 169 (1997). The court
distinguished Lai on the grounds that the arbitration clause in Lai did not "describe the
types of disputes that were to be subject to arbitration' and 'did not even refer to em-
ployment disputes." Id. at *6 (quoting Lai, 42 F.3d at 1305). In the case before the
Sixth Circuit, on the other hand, "the arbitration agreement . . . specifically referds] to
arbitration of 'any controversy arising out of or in connection with my compensation,
employment or termination of employment." Id. at *2. The dissenting judge would
have remanded the case to the district court for a finding of whether the claimant "was
indeed aware that she would be waiving her right to bring a Title VII action in federal
court merely by applying for a job with Shearson Lehman Brothers.' Id. at *3; see also
DeGaetano v. Smith Barney, Inc., No. 95 Civ. 1613, 1996 WL 44226, at *7 (S.D.N.Y.
Feb. 5, 1996) (distinguishing Lai on the ground that the agreement expressly described
the types of disputes that would be subject to arbitration); Pitter v. Prudential Life Ins.
Co. of Am., 906 F. Supp. 130, 139 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (rejecting the 'implicit . . . sugges-
tion' in Lai that 'federal law favoring arbitration and requiring liberal construction of
arbitration agreements is not applicable to statutory claims of discrimination.').
"2 144 F.3d 1182 (9th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, No. 98-237, 1998 WL 467389 (U.S.
Nov. 9, 1998).
"I Id. at 1190, 1195.
114 Id. at 1199. Nevertheless, the court held that 'because no state action is in-
volved there is no constitutional bar to employers requiring employees to agree in ad-
vance to arbitrate state-law tort and contract claims (other than for violation of a state
civil rights law).' Id. at 1185.
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under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act in federal court despite having
signed a Form U-4 containing a standard arbitration clause."' The
court based its decision not only on the congressional intent as ex-
pressed in the legislative history of Title VII but also on a "structural
bias" that it found in the NYSE arbitration system, in that it is domi-
nated by employers (i.e., brokerage firms), one of which was the
defendant in the litigation before the court." 6 The court stated:
Dominance of an arbitral system by one side in the dispute does not
comport with any model of arbitral impartiality, especially when that
dominance takes the form of selecting the entire arbitrator pool, appoint-
ing the individual arbitration panels, and making important procedural
and discovery decisions." 7
Whatever the competence or fairness of individual arbitrators who
participate [in] the NYSE system, its structural imbalance makes it an
inadequate forum for vindicating civil rights."
8
There are other signs that compulsory arbitration of employ-
ment discrimination claims is crumbling. In August 1997, the Board
of Directors of the NASD voted to exclude discrimination (including
sexual harassment) claims from the mandatory arbitration require-
ment of the Form U-4." 9 After considering the proposal for nearly
a year, the SEC approved it in June 1998.12 Under the amended
rule, firms are still free to require their employees to sign arbitration
agreements covering discrimination and harassment disputes as a
precondition of employment, but an employee no longer violates
NASD rules by filing a lawsuit covering such a claim.'2 '
"I Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 995 F. Supp. 190 (D.
Mass. 1998); see also Margaret A. Jacobs, Judge finds Merrill Lynch Can't Force Ex-Con-
sultant to Arbitrate Bias Claim, WALL ST. J., Jan. 27, 1998, at B8.
116 995 F. Supp. at 207.
"I Id. at 211.
11 Id.
"9 The rule change, which amends Rule 10201 of the NASD Code of Arbitration
Procedure provides as follows:
(b) A claim alleging employment discrimination or sexual harassment in
violation of a statute is not required to be arbitrated. Such a claim may be
arbitrated only if the parties have agreed to arbitrate it, either before or after
the dispute arose.
SEC Rel. No. 34-39421, 62 Fed. Reg. 242 (Dec. 10, 1997).
'10 SEC Rel. No. 34-40109, 63 Fed. Reg. 35299 Oune 29, 1998). The SEC had pub-
lished the proposed amendment (SR-NASD-97-77) for comment in December 1997. SEC
Release No. 34-39421, 62 Fed. Reg. 242 (Dec. 10, 1997). For a discussion of the
NASD proposal, see IX SEc. ARBTRAnON COMMENTATOR, NO. 4 at 8 (Nov. 1997).
"' Patrick McGeehan, NASD May Vote Today to Halt Mandated Harassment Arbitra-
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The rule change effectively leaves a brokerage-firm employee
in a similar situation with respect to arbitration of discrimination
claims as a brokerage-firm customer is with respect to all claims.
Both employees and customers are compelled to arbitrate a dispute
with the firm only if they have executed a valid arbitration agree-
ment covering the dispute. 22 Most firms require their customers to
sign such agreements as a condition of opening and maintaining a
brokerage account. 123 It is possible that the firms will impose the
same requirement on their employees. Thus, if brokerage firms
continue to require their employees to sign an arbitration agreement
as a condition of employment, employees will still be under pres-
sure to sign. 24 In September 1998, however, the NYSE board of
directors went one step further than the NASD, voting to stop pro-
viding a forum for arbitration of discrimination claims unless the
parties agree to arbitrate after the dispute has arisen. 25
In May 1998, Merrill Lynch, the largest brokerage firm in U.S.,
announced that it was adopting a new dispute resolution policy for
employees' civil rights claims under which the employee would not
be required to arbitrate such disputes. Merrill Lynch's initiative was
part of its attempt to settle a putative class action suit in Illinois
federal court, in which the plaintiffs claimed that the firm had sys-
tematically excluded women from employment opportunities and
advancement and had retaliated against those who complained.1 26
tion, WALL ST. J., Aug. 7, 1997, at B2; Patrick McGeehan, NASD Set to End Practice of
Submitting All Employment Disputes to Arbitration, WALL ST. J., July 21, 1997, at A4;
Floyd Norris, Job Hunting to Be Harder for Errant Brokers, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 1997, at
D3.
122 Under the new NASD rule, any arbitration clause covering discrimination claims
will have to be contained in the employment agreement between the brokerage firm and
its employee, not in the Form U-4 that the NASD requires the employee to sign. The
agreement to arbitrate might thus be subject to the exclusion contained in section 1 of
the FAA for contracts of employees in interstate commerce. See supra text accompanying
note 62.
2 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL REQUESTERS, SECURmES
ARBITRATION: How INVESTORS FARE, Pub. No. GAO/GGD-92-74, 28 (1992).
224 However, legislation introduced in Congress in 1998 by Senator Feingold and
Representative Markey would amend seven civil rights statutes to guarantee that federal
discrimination claims could be brought in a federal court. Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) No.
1834 (Aug. 12, 1998) at 2.
123 Patrick McGeehan, Big Board Moves To End Practice on Arbitrations, WALL ST. J.,
Sept. 4, 1998, at B6.
126 Merrill Adopts Dispute Resolution Program in Wake of Discrimination Suit Settle-
ment, 30 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 822 (May 29, 1998); see also Patrick McGeehan,
Merrill Lynch Is Drafting a New Policy That Could Let Employees Sue in Court, WALL
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Under the new policy, if an employee's claim of discrimination
could not be settled within the company, the employee would first
be required to submit the dispute to mediation. Merrill Lynch would
pay the costs of the mediation, including the mediator's fees. If the
matter was still not resolved, the employee would have three op-
tions: to arbitrate before an industry self-regulatory organization
such as the NASD; to arbitrate before the non-profit American Arbi-
tration Association or JAMS/Endispute, a professional provider of
dispute-resolution services; or to bring an action in court. Employee
claims against Merrill Lynch not involving discrimination would
continue to be subject to compulsory arbitration. 27
Salomon Smith Barney, also one of the largest brokerage firms,
similarly settled a sex-discrimination class action by agreeing to
establish a dispute-resolution system whereby employees would
bring such claims to a forum not operated by the securities industry.
Under the settlement, claimants will be permitted to take gender-
based claims to a mediator. If mediation does not resolve the claim,
it will then be brought to a panel of non-industry arbitrators.
128
These recent judicial and non-judicial developments apparently
reflect a deep concern felt by many judges and regulators with an
industry-wide system of dispute resolution that requires employees,
as a condition of their employment, to submit statutory
discrimination claims to binding arbitration in industry-sponsored
forums.
Whether large employers such as Merrill Lynch and Salomon
Smith Barney share this concern or are motivated principally by
considerations of legal exposure, employee morale, or public rela-
tions perceptions, their elimination of mandatory arbitration in these
cases is likely to be followed by other firms. Thus, although most
securities-industry employees' claims will continue to be arbitrated,
discrimination claims will now constitute a significant exception to
this practice.
ST. I., Jan. 22, 1998, at C1; Merrill Lynch Drops Mandatory Arbitration Under Agree-
ment Settling Discrimination Suit, 30 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 702 (May 8, 1998).
127 Merrill Adopts Dispute Resolution Program In Wake of Discrimination Suit Settle-
ment, 30 Sec. Reg. L. & Rep. (BNA) 822 (May 29, 1998).
228 Patrick McGeehan, Judge Approves Class-Action Settlement For Sex Harassment at
Smith Barney, WALL ST. J., July 27, 1998, at B4.
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IV. COMPETENCE OF ARBITRATORS
Beyond the legal issues, the DiRussa and perhaps the Halligan
cases raise questions about the competence of the arbitrators. In
DiRussa, it is not clear why the arbitrators failed to apply a "well
defined, explicit, and clearly applicable" provision of governing
law:129 namely, that a successful ADEA claimant is entitled to
attorneys' fees. It also not clear why the arbitrators in Halligan re-
jected his age discrimination claim in the face of strong evidence
supporting the claim. One would hope that most arbitrators believe
that their decisions' virtual freedom from judicial review places a
special burden on them to assure themselves that they are properly
weighing the evidence and applying the law.130 To do this, how-
ever, irequires enough knowledge and understanding of the applica-
ble law to enable the arbitrators to ask appropriate questions of the
parties, witnesses, and attorneys; to understand and interpret the
applicable law; and to apply the law correctly."' It is possible, of
course, that the virtual absence of judicial review encourages arbi-
trators to feel less responsibility to apply the law correctly. If the
arbitrators do not understand the law, or if they misapply or fail to
apply the law, claimants may be deprived of substantive rights that
they would be entitled to in a court proceeding. '32
129 121 F.3d 818, 821 (quoting Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner, & Smith, Inc. v.
Bobker, 808 F.2d 930, 933-34 (2d Cir. 1986)).
'30 See Cole v. Bums Int'l Sec. Serv., 105 F.3d 1465, 1488 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (Arbitra-
tors are under a professional obligation 'to handle statutory issues only if they are pre-
pared to fully protect the rights of statutory claimants. To meet that obligation, arbitrators
must educate themselves about the law.").
31 One commentator has stated that there are four kinds of situations that might
possibly come under the heading of "manifest disregard': (1) the arbitrator simply applies
the wrong law; (2) the arbitrator says he will apply the correct law but misapplies it; (3)
the arbitrator says that the law is unsettled but applies the law he prefers; and (4) the
arbitrator states the correct law, but then applies a different law. According to this writ-
er, only the fourth kind of situation is clearly manifest disregard of the law. Marta B.
Varela, Arbitration and the Doctrine of Manifest Disregard, 49 Disp. RESOL J. 64, 67 &
n.9 (1994) (citing Isabella de la Houssaye, Note, Manifest Disregard of the Law in Inter-
national Commercial Arbitrations, 2 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 449, 454 (1990)). DiRussa
seems to involve an additional fifth category: the arbitrators simply failed to apply the
applicable law.
32 For a debate between a lawyer who represents claimants and a lawyer who repre-
sents respondents on the competence of arbitrators in employment discrimination cases,
see Symposium, Employment Discrimination, New York Stock Exchange, Inc. Symposium
on Arbitration in the Securities Industry, 63 FORDHAM L. REv. 1613 (1995).
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With the inception of mandatory securities arbitration in 1987,
the problem of recruiting and training arbitrators became an urgent
one. The caseload of the NASD and the other arbitration forums
increased enormously, requiring these entities to expand their exist-
ing pools of arbitrators.133 In 1995, over 6,000 cases were filed
with the NASD, as compared to about 1,500 cases in 1986.134
Furthermore, the difficulty experienced by the SROs in maintaining
a sufficient number of qualified arbitrators was exacerbated by
several factors other than the increased caseload, including the
complexity of the issues involved in many of the cases coming
before arbitration panels; new arbitration rules and procedures,
particularly those calling for an increased opportunity for pre-hear-
ing discovery; scheduling delays; the longer duration of arbitrations,
partly as a result of the new rules; the demands imposed by manda-
tory training programs for arbitrators; and the low compensation of
arbitrators.13s In 1995, the NASD inaugurated an arbitrator recruit-
ment plan, which was designed to increase the number, quality,
and diversity of available arbitrators.
Few NASD or NYSE arbitrators, however, even if they are
lawyers, and even if they have expertise in securities issues, are
likely to have any substantial background in interpreting anti-dis-
crimination statutes. 3' Despite improvements in recruitment and
training of arbitrators, the NASD and NYSE exercise little control
over their competence. They do not require that arbitrators of em-
ployment cases have any background or expertise in employment
law or that they receive training in specific areas of the law. 37
"I Eighty-three percent of all arbitrations administered by securities industry organiza-
tions are with the NASD, while most of the remainder are with the NYSE. NORMAN S.
POSER, BROKER-DEALER LAW AND REGULATION 8-3 n.5 (Aspen Law & Business 2d ed.
1997).
"4 Id. at 8-3 to 8-5. Eighteen percent of these cases were disputes between broker-
dealers and their employees. Most of the remainder were disputes between broker-deal-
ers and customers. Id. at 8-3.
.3 See Robert S. Clemente, Trends in Securities Industry Arbitration: A View of the
Past, the Present, and the Future: 'The Dream, the Nightmare, and the Reality,' 68
N.Y. ST. B.J. 18 (Oct. 1996) (Mr. Clemente is Director of Arbitration of the NYSE).
'3 Symposium, Employment Discrimination, New York Stock Exchange, Inc. Sympo-
sium on Arbitration in the Securities Industry, 63 FORDHAM L. REv. 1613 (1995) (open-
ing remarks of Professor Katsoris).
"' GAO Discrimination Report, supra note 59, at 13; Megan L. Dunphy, Mandatory
Arbitration: Stripping Securities Industry Employees of Their Civil Rights, 44 CATH. U. L.
REv. 1169, 1198-1200 (1995). In October 1998, the NASD announced that it would
develop a special roster of arbitrators trained and experienced in discrimination law and
that it would adopt a requirement that panels hearing discrimination cases "be composed
19981
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The process whereby the SROs select arbitrators for particular cases
does not ensure that an arbitrator in an employment case be knowl-
edgeable about employment law.138 One commentator has stated
that arbitrators are far more likely than judges to rely extensively on
treatises and leading cases on employment discrimination law, with-
out citing to later cases decided by lower courts or less publicized
decisions. "This means that an arbitrator's decision may be based on
broad stroke principles to the exclusion of cases more analogous to
the claim being decided."" 9
The compensation that arbitrators receive from the NASD,
$225 per day, with the chairman of the panel receiving an addition-
al $50 per day, is considerably lower than the normal compensation
of an active lawyer, securities professional, or even professor of fi-
nance or law. As a result, the NASD pool of arbitrators tends to be
composed largely of retired persons and full-time professional arbi-
trators.14° While such persons often bring substantial experience to
their role as arbitrators, some of them may lack the vigor and
breadth of outlook necessary to arbitrate a complex securities or
employment case. Furthermore, persons who frequently serve as
arbitrators may be subject to subtle pressures if a significant portion
of their livelihood depends on that activity. In particular, if an arbi-
trator decides too many cases adversely to brokerage firms, he or
she is likely to be challenged peremptorily by brokerage firms in
future cases. 1' The converse is less likely to be true because it is
of arbitrators who, in their private capacities, do not primarily represent employers or
employees.' NASD Proposes Arbitration Changes For Industry Statutory Discrimination
Claims, 30 Sec. Reg. L. Rep. (BNA) 1472 (Oct. 9, 1998).
" Dunphy, supra note 137, at 1174.
1 Richard H. Block & Elizabeth A. Barasch, Practical Ramifications of Arbitration of
Employment Discrimination Claims, Proceedings of 44th Annual Meeting of New York
University's Conf. on Labor, (1991), at 281, 294. An empirical study conducted in 1975
by Professor (now Judge) Harry T. Edwards showed that only a small percentage of the
arbitrators surveyed could explain the current status of discrimination law or define rele-
vant terms, and only about 72 percent of these arbitrators felt professionally competent
to decide legal issues in employment discrimination cases. Sixteen percent had never
read a judicial opinion on the subject, and most of these did not regularly read labor
law advance sheets to keep abreast of current developments on discrimination law.
Harry T. Edwards, Arbitration of Employment Discrimination Cases: An Empirical Study,
Proceedings of the 28th Annual Meeting of the National Academy of Arbitrators (1976),
at 71-72. These findings of course are more than twenty years old and may have limit-
ed value today.
14o GAO Discrimination Report, supra note 59, at 57.
141 In an NASD or NYSE arbitration, each party has one peremptory challenge and an
unlimited number of challenges for cause. NYSE RuLE 609; NASD RuLE 10311.
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less feasible or cost-effective for investors' or employees' lawyers to
investigate arbitrators' previous decisions and keep detailed records
of them.
The NASD inaugurated a voluntary training program for arbitra-
tors in 1985, making the program mandatory in 1993.142 Accord-
ing to the NASD's 1996 Ruder Report: "The mandatory program is
typically a day long program and provides a basic overview of the
securities arbitration process."143 Unfortunately, requiring potential
arbitrators to attend training sessions has deterred potential arbitra-
tors from participating. Many of them apparently believe that neither
the compensation they receive nor the frequency with which they
serve on panels justifies attending the training sessions. When the
program became mandatory in 1993, the pool of NASD arbitrators
dropped from 7,000 to 2,400.4
Improvement in the selection and training of arbitrators would
be an important step toward avoiding erroneous arbitral decisions
such as those that occurred in DiRussa and Halligan, but this is
unlikely to be a complete solution. Justice Black pointed out more
than thirty years ago that arbitrators "in all probability will be
nonlawyers, wholly unqualified to decide legal issues."145 Further-
more, arbitrators with extensive experience in employment law are
often challenged by one or more parties to a dispute.'46 The avail-
ability of arbitrators competent to decide discrimination claims is
likely to remain limited, given the heavy caseload of the SRO arbi-
tration departments and the modest compensation that arbitrators
receive.
Requiring arbitrators to be lawyers who are conversant with
federal and state anti-discrimination statutes and judicial interpreta-
42 Deborah Masucci, Securities Arbitration-A Success Story: What Does the Future
Hold?, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 183, 199 (1996).
243 Ruder Report, supra note 107, at 108. In addition to the introductory training
session, the NASD offers a voluntary program for panel chairmen, as well as continuing
education for arbitrators, which includes seminars and workshops. Id.; Masucci, supra
note 142, at 199. For example, the NASD scheduled nineteen training sessions in elev-
en cities for the month of March 1997. See 8 SEc. ARBITRATION COMMENTATOR, No. 8,
at 18 (Dec. 1996).
'44 Masucci, supra note 142, at 199. By 1996, however, the size of the pool had
risen to 4,600. Id. at 200; Ruder Report, supra note 107, at 102.
4I Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 407 (1967) (Black,
J., dissenting).
'" Symposium, Employment Discrimination New York Stock Exchange, Inc. Sympo-




tions of these statutes seems impractical. Even if such persons could
be found, they would require substantially higher compensation
than the modest sum that the SROs pay their arbitrators. Raising the
level of competence of arbitrators is a desirable goal, but there is no
way of avoiding reliance on judicial review in order to guarantee
that persons making discrimination claims before an arbitrator re-
ceive the same substantive rights as they would if they had brought
their claims in court.
V. JUDICIAL REvIEw OF ARBITRATION AWARDS: MANIFEST DISREGARD
OF THE LAW
The holdings of the DiRussa and Halligan cases focus on the
scope of the judicial review of the arbitrators' decisions. Having
been required to submit his statutory age discrimination claim to
arbitration as a condition of his employment by an NYSE member
firm, the Second Circuit panel held that DiRussa was not entitled to
the rights afforded to him by the ADEA. To be more precise, the
court held that DiRussa was entitled only to those protections of the
ADEA that the arbitrators chose to allow him. Specifically, although
the ADEA provides that a successful claimant is entitled to reason-
able attorneys' fees, the arbitrators' denial of these fees was not
reviewable by the court. An observer not familiar with American
arbitration law might be surprised to learn that a reviewing court is
powerless to vacate an arbitral award, even if the arbitrators made a
clear error of statutory law. 147
In Halligan, the Second Circuit, without giving any explana-
tion, reversed the usual presumption that protected arbitrators'
awards. Previously, the courts held an arbitrator's decision would
be confirmed if any rational basis for it could be found. The
Halligan court concluded, to the contrary, that arbitrators who
render an award that goes against the weight of the evidence acted
in manifest disregard of the law unless they write an opinion pro-
147 See Miller v. Prudential Bache Sec., Inc., 884 F.2d 128, 130 (4th Cir. 1989);
French v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 784 F.2d 902, 906 (9th Cir.
1985). Under section 57 of the Arbitration Act of 1996 of the United Kingdom, a court
is not necessarily bound by an arbitral decision. William W. Park, The Interaction of the
Courts and Arbitrators in England: the 1996 Act as a Model for the United States?, 1
INT'L ARB. L. REv. 54, 63 n.1 14 (1998).
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viding a rationale for the award. Although this decision appears
sensible and just, it should be recognized as a radical departure
from existing arbitration law.
Because speed, economy, and finality are the paramount goals
of arbitration, the scope of judicial review of arbitral awards is
narrow.'48 The FAA provides for only limited judicial review of
arbitration awards.'49 The FAA lists four grounds for vacating an
award: (1) where the award was procured by corruption, fraud or
undue means; (2) where there was evident partiality or corruption
in the arbitrators; (3) where the arbitrators were guilty of miscon-
duct; (4) where the arbitrators exceeded their powers. 5 All but
two circuit courts have held that, in addition to these four statutory
grounds, an arbitral award may be vacated on a non-statutory
ground: if the arbitrators acted "in manifest disregard of the
law.""'1 However, in conformity with the Supreme Court's strong
pro-arbitration policy, the federal courts have given almost unques-
tioning deference to arbitral awards and have construed manifest
disregard narrowly.
"4 If the court can find any "argument that is legally plausible and supports the
award," it must confirm the award. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Jaros,
70 F.3d 418, 421 (6th Cir. 1995).
149 See Loughridge v. Allen, 25 F.3d 1057 (10th Cir. 1994) ("'[N]o matter how dubi-
ous an arbitrator's decision might appear . . . if the arbitrator did not stray beyond the
four comers of the agreement to find the essence of his decision, the arbitrator's award
must be upheld. . . .This is so regardless that error has been committed or that a court
would reach a contrary conclusion." (quoting NCR Corp., E & M-Wichita v. Intemation-
al Ass'n of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, Dist. Lodge No. 70, 906 F.2d 1499,
1504 (10th Cir. 1990)).
'- 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(1)-(4) (1994). In addition, a court may modify or correct an
award on three grounds: " (a) Where there was an evident material miscalculation of fig-
ures or an evident material mistake in a description of any person, thing, or property
referred to in the award. (b) Where the arbitrators have awarded upon a matter not
submitted to them . . . . (c) Where the award is imperfect in matter of form not affect-
ing the merits of the controversy." 9 U.S.C. § 11(a)-(c) (1994).
I Only the Fifth and Seventh Circuits have rejected the "manifest disregard" ground.
Baravati v. Iosephthal, Lyon & Ross, Inc., 28 F.3d 704, 706 (7th Cir. 1994); R.M. Perez
& Assoc., Inc. v. Welch, 960 F.2d 534, 539-40 (5th Cir. 1992). The Fifth Circuit, how-
ever, has stated that it will vacate an award if it is "fundamentally unfair' or if it vio-
lates a specific and clearly identifiable public policy. Gulf Coast Indus. Workers Union
v. Exxon Co., U.S.A., 991 F.2d 244, 249 (5th Cir. 1993); R.M. Perez & Assoc. v.
Welch, 960 F.2d 534, 539-40 (5th Cir. 1992). The Arbitrator's Manual, compiled by
members of the Securities Industry Conference on Arbitration, also states that an award




DiRussa argued before the Second Circuit panel that the
arbitrators' refusal to award him reasonable attorney's fees should
be vacated or modified on two grounds: that the arbitrators exceed-
ed their powers, and that they acted in manifest disregard of the
law. In rejecting the argument that the arbitrators had exceeded
their powers, the court gave a narrow interpretation to Section
10(a)(4) of the FAA, which permits vacatur of an award on such
ground. The court's inquiry into deciding whether the arbitrators
exceeded their powers focused on whether the arbitrators had the
power to reach the issue of attorney's fe es, not on whether the
arbitrators correctly decided that issue. The parties had clearly sub-
mitted to the arbitrators the issue of whether DiRussa was entitled
to attorney's fees, and this issue was properly before the arbitrators.
Thus, the court found that the arbitrators did not exceed their pow-
ers when they decided not to award attorneys' fees, stating,
"DiRussa's real objection appears to be that the arbitrators commit-
ted an obvious legal error in denying him attorney's fees. Section
10(a)(4) was not intended to apply to such a situation." 52
The Second Circuit's decision that the DiRussa arbitrators did
not act in manifest disregard of the law raises difficult and troubling
issues. The judicially created "manifest disregard" ground for vaca-
tur represents an attempt by the federal courts to resolve the inher-
ent contradiction between the goal that arbitrators faithfully and
accurately apply the law and the absence of meaningful judicial
152 DiRussa v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 121 F.3d 818, 824 (2d Cir. 1997), cert.
denied, 118 S. Ct. 695 (1998). The court's rejection of DiRussa's argument that the
arbitrators exceeded their authority seems correct. Admittedly, section 10(a)(4) of the FAA
raises complex and important definitional questions. If, for example, an arbitration panel
awards a claimant punitive damages despite the fact that the law applicable to the dis-
pute does not permit arbitrators to make such an award, it has been held that the arbi-
trators exceeded their powers and that the award must therefore be vacated under sec-
tion 10(a)(4). See Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 20 F.3d 713, 716 (7th
Cir. 1994), rev'd on other grounds, 514 U.S. 52 (1995). It might be equally plausible,
however, to say that the arbitrators simply made an error of law by awarding punitive
damages, which would not be a ground for setting aside the award.
In DiRussa, however, the argument that the arbitrators lacked the power not to
award attomey's fees seems a weaker example of lacking power than the punitive-dam-
ages example. It is easier to assert that a person lacks the power to do something than
to assert he or she lacks the power not to do something. Arguably, however, if the
DiRussa court had decided that the arbitrators' refusal to award attorney's fees exceeded
their powers, the court's interpretation of section 10(a)(4) would have so broadened this
provision that it could conceivably be made the basis for vacating any erroneous award.
It is difficult to construe section 10 of the FAA, which carefully spells out narrow
grounds for review of arbitral decisions, in a way that would permit such a result.
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review to enforce this goal. Stated another way, the manifest disre-
gard ground is an attempt to balance "the public interest in having
arbitrators stay within the applicable law versus the public policy in
favor of speedy and economical function of the arbitration
process.""5 3
The manifest disregard standard had its origin in dictum in the
Supreme Court's 1953 opinion in Wilko v. Swan."5 4 In Wilko, the
Court held that agreements to arbitrate disputes arising under the
Securities Act of 1933 ("1933 Act") were unenforceable, essentially
because, in the Court's view at that time, arbitration did not assure
a purchaser of securities that he would receive the same rights un-
der the statute that he would if he had brought suit in a federal
court. The Court pointed to the narrow scope of judicial review of
arbitration awards as a basis for its holding:
Even though the provisions of the Securities Act, advantageous to the
buyer, apply, their effectiveness in application is lessened in arbitration as
compared to judicial proceedings.... Power to vacate an award is limit-
ed .... [lI]nterpretations of the law by the arbitrators in contrast to mani-
fest disregard are not subject... to judicial review for error in
interpretation. 5 '
Although the Supreme Court overruled Wilko in 1989, holding
that agreements to arbitrate 1933 Act claims were enforceable,"'6
it subsequently cited Wilko's manifest disregard dictum with
approval."s7 The Court's observations concerning the limits of judi-
cial review therefore remain pertinent." 8 As the Wilko Court sug-
gested, manifest disregard requires more than a mere error or mis-
understanding with respect to the law. In general, the courts will
not vacate or modify an award unless the moving party can show
that no proper basis for the award can be inferred from the facts of
the case. 9 Given the fact that arbitrators seldom write opinions
"I Varela, supra note 131, at 71 (citing Sobel v. Hertz, Warner & Co., 469 F.2d
1211, 1215 (2d Cir. 1972)).
154 346 U.S. 427 (1953), overruled by Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American
Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
1 346 U.S. at 435-37 (emphasis added).
"' Rodriguez de Quijas, 490 U.S. at 477. Two years before Rodriguez, the Court,
without formally overruling Wilko, had held that agreements to arbitrate 1934 Act claims
were enforceable. Shearson/American Express v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
l"I First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 942 (1995).
1 But see Baravati v. Josephthal, Lyon & Ross, Inc., 28 F.3d 704, 706 (7th Cir.
1994) (Supreme Court's overruling of Wilko also discredits its "manifest disregard' dic-
tum).
'" Wall St. Assoc., L.P. v. Becker Paribas, Inc., 27 F.3d 845, 849 (2d Cir. 1994); see
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explaining their decisions, there is little likelihood that a losing
party in an arbitration will be able to persuade a reviewing court
that the arbitrators manifestly disregarded the law. Consequently,
although most circuit courts have adopted "manifest disregard of the
law" as a non-statutory ground for vacating or modifying an award,
until recently there have been few cases in which a court has set
aside an arbitral award on this ground."6 A recent example of
such a case is the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Montes v. Shearson
Lehman Bros., Inc.,"6 where the record of the arbitration hearing
showed that Shearson's attorney explicitly urged the arbitrators to
disregard the law, and the court observed that "there [was] nothing
in the record to show that they did not do so."162 But it must be
exceedingly rare for an attorney to make the mistake of opening the
door for vacatur in this way.
163
also Edward D. Jones & Co. v. Schwartz, 969 S.W.2d 788, 795 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998)
(under federal law, an award may not be set aside for manifest disregard of the law
unless the moving party can establish "that the arbitrators understood and correctly stated
the law but proceeded to ignore it.').
11 Only a few years ago, one writer stated: "[Alithough the 'manifest disregard' of
the law standard has been discussed in dozens of cases involving judicial review of
arbitration awards resulting from securities disputes, no cases have been identified where
a vacation of a securities arbitration award has been clearly upheld on appeal.' Brad A.
Galbraith, Vacatur of Commercial Arbitration Awards in Federal Court: Contemplating
the Use and Utility of the 'Manifest Disregard' of the Law Standard, 27 IND. L. REV.
241, 252 (1993). Although such cases are still rare, this statement could not be made
today.
161 128 F.3d 1456 (11th Cir. 1997).
162 Id. at 1459. Montes was the first case in which the Eleventh Circuit adopted the
"manifest disregard' ground for vacating an arbitral award. The claimant had initiated the
arbitration to recover overtime pay from her former employer, pursuant to section 207 of
the Fair Labor Standards Act ('FLSA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1994), which requires that
covered employees receive overtime pay when they work more than 40 hours a week.
The Shearson attorney argued to the arbitrators that 'in this case the law is not right'
and that the arbitrators were free to disregard the law and 'do what is right and just
and equitable.' Id. at 1459. The Eleventh Circuit evidently found that the arbitrators
had done just that. Id. at 1458-60.
63 In Cohig & Assoc., Inc. v. Stamm, 149 F.3d 1190, No. 97-1119, 1998 WL
339472 (10th Cir. June 10, 1998) (unpublished decision), the court, in an unpublished
opinion, refused to vacate an award in favor of a claimant under circumstances some-
what similar to those of Montes. The claimant, a 78-year-old retiree appearing pro se,
stated in a written submission to the arbitrator that arbitration was not a legal action
and requested that the arbitrator's decision "assurefs] the full responsibility towards the
public and the good will and moral result.' Id. at *6. The court held that the claimant
was not asking the arbitrator to disregard the law but 'was merely urging the arbitrator
to consider the policy supporting his claim.' Id. The court distinguished Montes: 'In
this case, neither the record nor the award indicates that the arbitrator viewed Mr.
Stamm's innocuous statement as urging disregard of the law.' Id.
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The leading Second Circuit case before the DiRussa decision,
Merrill Lynch Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Bobker,1M defined
the manifest disregard standard as follows:
The error must have been obvious and capable of being readily and in-
stantly perceived by the average person qualified to serve as an arbitrator.
Moreover, the term "disregard" implies that the arbitrator appreciates the
existence of a clearly governing legal principle but decides to ignore or
pay no attention to it .... To adopt a less strict standard of judicial re-
view would be to undermine our well established deference to arbitration
as a favored method of settling disputes when agreed to by the parties.
judicial inquiry under the "manifest disregard" standard is therefore ex-
tremely limited. The governing law alleged to have been ignored by the
arbitrators must be well defined, explicit, and clearly applicable. We are
not at liberty to set aside an arbitration panel's award because of an argu-
able difference regarding the meaning or applicability of laws urged upon
it.1
65
In DiRussa, the governing law that the arbitrators failed to
apply met the stringent standard set forth in Bobker. The require-
ment of the ADEA that a successful party, such as DiRussa, be
awarded attorney's fees was "well defined, explicit, and clearly
applicable." However, the Second Circuit found that the arbitrators
did not manifestly disregard the law "because there- is no persuasive
evidence that the arbitrators actually knew of-and intentionally
disregarded-the mandatory aspect of the ADEA's fee provi-
sion."166 Although DiRussa's attorney indicated several times dur-
164 808 F.2d 930 (2d Cir. 1986).
165 Id. at 933-34; see also Fahnestock & Co., Inc. v. Waltman, 935 F.2d 512, 516
(2d Cir. 1991); Carte Blanche (Singapore) Pte., Ltd. v. Carte Blanche Int'l, Ltd., 888 F.2d
260, 265 (2d Cir. 1989); Advest, Inc. v. McCarthy, 914 F.2d 6, 10 (1st Cir. 1990) ('In
certain circumstances, the governing law may have such widespread familiarity, pristine
clarity, and irrefutable applicability that a court could assume the arbitrators knew the
rule and, notwithstanding, swept it under the rug. The case at bar, however, is not cut
to so rare a pattern . . .).
11 DiRussa v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 121 F.3d 818, 822 (2d Cir. 1997), cert.
denied, 118 S. Ct. 695 (1998). In this regard, the district court stated:
I am not persuaded that the entitlement of an ADEA claimant to attorney's
fees, which the statutory scheme provides by applying the FLSA to the ADEA,
is 'capable of being readily and instantly perceived' by the average NASD
securities industry arbitrator.... Plaintiff's counsel never argued to the arbitra-
tors that an award of attorney's fees under the ADEA was mandatory.
DiRussa, 936 F. Supp. 104, 107 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
A possible alternative basis for refusing to vacate the award might be that the arbi-
trators found that the respondents violated the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination,
which does not require an award of attorneys' fees, but that they did not violate the
ADEA. Since the arbitrators did not write an opinion, it is at least conceivable that this
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ing the arbitration that he was "entitled" to attorney's fees under the
ADEA (and the NJLAD),
at no point did DiRussa communicate.., to the arbitrators that the ADEA
mandated such an award to a prevailing party .... Nowhere [in
DiRussa's brief to the arbitrators regarding attorney's fees]... does
DiRussa either explain that the ADEA requires an award of attorney's fees
or quote the language of the relevant ADEA section, which clearly com-
municates that principle.167
Considering that the absence of formal pleading or evidentiary
requirements is generally regarded to be one of the principal advan-
tages of arbitration over litigation in court,'68 it is difficult to justify
the fine distinction that the DiRussa court made between arguing to
the arbitrators that the claimant is entitled to attorney's fees, on the
one hand, and explaining to the arbitrators that the ADEA requires
an award of attorney's fees, on the other. Presumably, if DiRussa's
attorney had presented a copy of the ADEA to the arbitrators and
pointed out to them the provision requiring an award of attorney's
fees, the arbitrators' refusal to award the fees would have been
manifest disregard of the law. However, the arbitrators' refusal to
award fees after being told by DiRussa's attorney that he was enti-
tled to them did not constitute manifest disregard. Such a fine dis-
tinction appears to -be unduly formalistic. Although court proceed-
ings have largely abandoned procedural and evidentiary formal-
ism,' 69 it appears, paradoxically, to survive, if not to flourish, in
the supposedly more informal arbitration proceedings. 70
is what happened. Because the record of the case was sealed, it is impossible to know
whether or not the respondents argued this theory before the court. In any event, nei-
ther the district court nor the appellate court mentioned this theory in their opinions.
' DiRussa, 121 F.3d at 823. In DeGaetano v. Smith Barney, Inc., 983 F. Supp. 459
(S.D.N.Y. 1997), a case decided a few months after DiRussa, an employee of a broker-
age firm prevailed in her arbitration claim of sexual harassment in violation of Title VII.
As in DiRussa, the arbitration panel refused to award the claimant her attorney's fees,
even though such an award to a prevailing plaintiff is mandatory under the Act. Distin-
guishing DiRussa on the ground that DeGaetano had brought the applicable law to the
attention of the arbitrators, the district court held that the arbitrators had acted in mani-
fest disregard of the law. Id. at 462-64.
1' See Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 115 S. Ct. 834 (1995) (quoting Amer-
ican Bar Association amicus brief which pointed out that one of the many advantages of
arbitration over litigation is that it "can have simpler procedural and evidentiary rules').
169 More than eighty years ago, Judge Benjamin Cardozo wrote: 'The law has out-
grown its primitive stage of formalism when the precise word was the sovereign talis-
man, and every slip was fatal. It takes a broader view today.' Wood v. Lucy, Lady
Duff-Gordon, 118 N.E. 214 (N.Y. 1917).
170 Judge Selya of the First Circuit has pointed out that 'securities arbitration . . . is
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The consequence of allowing formalism to be introduced into
arbitrations is likely to destroy the advantages of speed and econo-
my that are the principal justifications for arbitration. If an attorney
representing a client in an arbitration wishes to preserve the mani-
fest disregard ground for review, he or she must be ever alert to the
need to spell out every claim in detail and to cite to the arbitrators
the text of every statute on which he or she is relying, even if this
will prolong the proceedings and add to the parties' costs. A large
premium is therefore placed on the skill and assiduousness of the
lawyers. And what about a pro se claimant without legal skills or
knowledge? If that claimant is himself unaware of the law, he or she
of course cannot quote the relevant statute to the arbitrators, and
the arbitrators therefore cannot manifestly disregard the law. 7"
However clear the law and its applicability to the case may be, the
court is powerless to correct an arbitral error.
The manifest disregard of the law standard of review, as inter-
preted by the Second Circuit in Bobker and DiRussa, is based on an
unstated premise of dubious validity: that arbitrators should main-
tain an attitude of passivity when hearing a case, and should sit
back and consider only the testimony and documents that are
brought to their attention. On the contrary, as I pointed out several
years ago, if arbitration is to retain its special advantages over court
proceedings, it is important that arbitrators take an active role at the
hearing in ascertaining the relevant facts and the applicable law:
[A]rbitrators can maximize the unique benefits of arbitration, while
preserving the fairness that is the goal of both arbitration and the legal
process. Having observed a number of panels in action, I think the ones
that operate most successfully are those whose members do not sit back
passively and leave it to the opposing attorneys to run the show entirely.
It is perhaps appropriate for a judge to take that stance, but not an arbi-
tration panel.
The most effective panels take an active role throughout the pro-
ceedings. They ask searching questions of witnesses .... They cut
through verbiage and legal technicalities and go right to the heart of the
matter as quickly and efficiently as possible. Where appropriate, they use
coming to resemble the old tyranny, conventional adjudication' and that '[ilncreasingly
formalized procedural and evidentiary standards abound.' Bruce M. Selya, Arbitration
Unbound?: The Legacy of McMahon, 62 BROOK. L. REV. 1433, 1434, 1446 (1996).
171 Of course, a pro se claimant cannot claim an award of attorney's fees, but the
manifest disregard ground for review potentially covers the disregard of any law.
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and carefully consider the opinions and analysis of experts, but they don't
allow long or unnecessary expositions of the obvious. In most cases, they
reach a just result with a minimum of delay.72
The DiRussa decision points in the opposite direction. It suggests
that arbitrators are under no obligation to ascertain what the law is,
even if a party argues that he or she has rights under a particular
statute. In fact, it encourages arbitrators to be passive and even lazy,
because the less they learn about the applicable law, the less likely
it is that their award will be vacated or modified.
It is also questionable whether the Bobker and DiRussa courts'
definition of the term "manifest disregard" is linguistically correct.
"Disregard" does not only mean ignoring something that is brought
to a person's attention. Used as a noun, "disregard" means the "lack
of thoughtful attention or due regard,"' a definition that could
well encompass the DiRussa arbitrators' failure to award attorney's
fees after they had been told that DiRussa was entitled to them.
"Manifest" means "clearly apparent to the sight or understanding;
obvious." 74 Significantly, the Supreme Court's dictum in Wilko,
which was the original source of the manifest disregard standard,
does not identify the person to whom the disregard must be "mani-
fest."'"" The DiRussa court assumed that the disregard must be
manifest to the arbitration panel, but the language from Wilko quot-
ed above suggests that it is not the arbitrators but the reviewing
court to whom the disregard must be manifest. In other words,
where the arbitrators failed to apply a federal statutory rule and
their failure constituted clear error, as the Second Circuit conceded
to be the case in DiRussa, a compelling argument can be made that
the arbitrators acted in manifest disregard of the law.
The court's opinion in Halligan refers to a broader policy prob-
lem that is raised by the DiRussa court's narrow interpretation of the
manifest disregard ground for vacatur. 76 Over the past two de-
cades, the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that agreements to
172 Norman S. Poser, The Proper Use of an Expert in Securities Arbitration, Address
at a Meeting of Arbitrators of the Nat'l Ass'n of Sec. Dealers (Oct. 16, 1991).
173 THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 538 (3d ed. 1992).
114 Id. at 1093.
17s See Kenneth R. Davis, When Ignorance of the Law Is No Excuse: Judicial Review
of Arbitration Awards, 45 BUFF. L. REv. 49, 90-91 (1997) (Tlhere is only one persuasive
interpretation of 'manifest.' It denotes a clearly discernible error as opposed to one ob-
scured by an unexplained award.").
176 Halligan v. Piper Jaffray, Inc., 148 F.3d 197, 203 (2d Cir. 1998).
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arbitrate future disputes must be enforced, even though the dispute
may involve the vindication of a party's rights under a federal stat-
ute. The Court has upheld agreements to arbitrate claims arising
under the Sherman Act,'77 the Securities Exchange Act of
1934,178 the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations ("RI-
CO") statute,179 the Securities Act of 1933,180 and the Age Dis-
crimination in Employment Act.181 In each of these cases, the
Court rigorously upheld the requirement of the FAA that agreements
to arbitrate must be enforced to the same extent as other con-
tracts. 182 In cases where a conflict existed between this FAA policy
and policies that favor judicial resolution of federally granted rights,
the Court opted for the FAA and arbitration. If the parties had
agreed to arbitrate a statutory claim, that agreement would be
enforced to the same extent as any other arbitration agreement.
Each time the Supreme Court upheld an agreement to arbitrate
a federal statutory claim, the Court stated an important corollary to
its pro-arbitration holding, which was apparently intended to avoid
the possibility that arbitrators might make decisions inconsistent
with the provisions of federal law that were designed to protect
certain categories of persons (e.g., investors in the case of the feder-
al securities laws; older persons in the case of the ADEA). The
Court stated that by agreeing to arbitrate the parties did not surren-
der their substantive rights under a federal statute. The arbitration
agreement changed only the forum in which the dispute was to be
heard; the substantive law governing the dispute remained the
same, regardless of whether the dispute was tried before a court or
a panel of arbitrators.' 83 This apparently was how the Court at-
177 Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
17 Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
17 Id.
11 Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
18 Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
182 Section 2 of the FAA provides:
A written provision in ... a contract evidencing a transaction involving [inter-
state or foreign] commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter
arising out of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole
or any part thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an
existing controversy arising out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall
be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law
or in equity for the revocation of any contract.
9 U.S.C. § 2 (1984).
183 See, e.g., Rodriguez de Quijas 490 U.S. at 481 ("'By agreeing to arbitrate a statu-
tory claim, a party does not forgo the substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only
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tempted to reconcile the potentially conflicting policies and require-
ments of the FAA, on the one hand, and of the particular federal
regulatory statute, on the other. If, for example, an employee initiat-
ed an arbitration against his or her employer for violating a federal
anti-discrimination statute, the arbitrators would be required to
apply the same law to the dispute as a court would apply.TM
Thus, the claimant's rights would be vindicated, but the dispute
would be resolved with all the advantages of economy, speed,
privacy, and finality that arbitration is designed to provide.
This happy resolution of the competing policies of the FAA and
the ADEA cannot be assured, however, if there is no effective judi-
cial review of arbitrators' awards. The DiRussa court failed to con-
front this important issue; the Halligan court confronted the issue
but tried unsuccessfully to force it into the Procrustean bed of mani-
fest disregard of the law. A different standard of judicial review
needs to be formulated in order to enable the courts to ensure that
parties in arbitrations will not be deprived of fundamental rights.
VI. FORMULATING A NEW STANDARD OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
Every circuit court, with the exception of the Seventh Circuit,
has supplemented the four statutory grounds of Section 10(a) of the
FAA for vacating an arbitration award with a judicially created, non-
statutory ground. Although the courts usually articulate the non-
statutory ground as "manifest disregard of the law," some courts
have applied other labels to it, either in combination with or as a
substitute for the manifest disregard standard. Thus, courts have
held that an arbitration award may be vacated if it violates public
submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum.") (quoting
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985)).
28 Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. at 628).
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policy,' is completely irrational, 8 ' is arbitrary and capri-
cious,187 is fundamentally unfair,'88 is an abuse of discretion,'89
or does not "draw its essence" from the agreement to arbitrate.' 90
Despite the deference that is normally given to arbitrators'
awards, several courts have recognized that they must have the
authority to overturn awards that are egregiously wrong. The fram-
ers of the FAA contemplated that the statute would enable business
persons with comparable bargaining power to enforce arbitration
clauses in commercial agreements, not that businesses would use it
to require their customers and employees to arbitrate any future
disputes, including disputes that might arise under federal regulatory
or anti-discrimination statutes. Given the recent expansion of the
FAA's scope, the Supreme Court has emphasized in Gilmer and
other cases that when a party agrees to arbitrate a statutory claim,
the party does not give up his or her substantive rights under the
statute. Thus, the Court has suggested that a court reviewing an
arbitration award must apply a standard of review that is broad
enough to ensure vindication of statutory claims.
The Halligan decision, where the court, purporting to apply the
manifest disregard standard, vacated an arbitration panel's award
that went against the weight of the evidence is consistent with this
view. Similarly, in the recent case of Cole v. Burns Int'l. Sec. Serv.,
Inc.,'91 the District of Columbia Circuit expressly broadened the
manifest disregard standard in statutory cases, holding that in such
cases the court's review must be "sufficiently rigorous to ensure that
arbitrators have properly interpreted and applied statutory law."'92
18 Rodriguez v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 882 F. Supp. 1202, 1208 (D.P.R. 1995)
(citing United Paper Workers' Int'l. Union, AFL-CIO v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 43
(1987)).
18 McLaughlin, Piven, Vogel, Inc. v. Gross, 699 F. Supp. 55, 58 (E.D. Pa. 1988).
187 Brown v. Rauscher Pierce Refsnes, Inc., 994 F.2d 775, 779 (11th Cir. 1993).
8 Bowles Fin. Group, Inc. v. Stifel, Nicolaus & Co., Inc., 22 F.3d 1010, 1013 (10th
Cir. 1994).
189 Jenkins v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 847 F.2d 631, 633-34 (10th Cir. 1988).
ISo Michigan Mut. Ins. Co. v. Unigard Sec. Ins. Co. 44 F.3d 826, 830-31 (9th Cir.
1995).
191 105 F.3d 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
192 Id. at 1487. In Cole, a Title VII case based on racial discrimination, the manifest
disregard standard of review was a tangential issue. The plaintiff claimed his agreement
to arbitrate was unenforceable because the arbitrator's rulings would not be subject to
judicial review. Id. at 1486. In rejecting that argument, the court held that the manifest
disregard standard, under the court's broadened interpretation, would adequately assure
the plaintiff that his statutory rights would be protected. Id. at 1487.
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Although both the Halligan and Cole courts ostensibly remain wed-
ded to the manifest disregard standard, both courts have in fact
adopted a new standard of review. In Cole, the District of Columbia
Circuit stated that a modified manifest disregard standard would
apply to statutory claims; in Halligan, the Second Circuit purported
to be applying the traditional manifest disregard standard as inter-
preted by the Second Circuit in Bobker and DiRussa but instead
applied a different standard sub silentio."9 '
Halligan and Cole tell us that, regardless of whether arbitrators
knew the law and disregarded it, an award will be vacated if the
arbitrators deny a claimant statutory rights to which he or she is
entitled. If this new standard of review had been applied in
DiRussa, the Second Circuit would also have vacated the arbitrators'
denial of DiRussa's attorneys' fees and would thus have prevented a
shocking miscarriage of justice.
The courts should expressly adopt this broader standard of
review for arbitrators' awards involving statutory claims. "Manifest
disregard" is an unsatisfactory standard, the only justification for it
being that the Supreme Court used the words in a dictum forty-five
years ago, in a case that the Court subsequently overruled. Although
the Cole redefinition of the standard of review was confined to
"statutory cases in which an employee has been forced to resort to
arbitration as a condition of employment,"'94 its broader scope of
review should be extended to any claim based on a statute, whether
or not signing an arbitration agreement was a condition of employ-
ment. This conclusion follows from several statements of the Su-
preme Court asserting that non-employees who bring claims under
"I In Chisolm v. Kidder, Peabody Asset Management, Inc., 966 F. Supp. 218
(S.D.N.Y. 1997), aft'd, No. 97-7828, 1998 WL 695041 (2d Cir. July 28, 1998) (unpub-
lished opinion), the district court refused to vacate an arbitration award denying relief to
a claimant under the ADEA. Although the court believed that the claimant 'raises some
important concerns regarding the adequacy of arbitration in this area,' it stated that
"Second Circuit precedent compels the conclusion that the standard of judicial review of
arbitral decisions in cases involving statutory rights is no different from the extremely
limited review used in arbitration generally.' Id. at 219; see Appellate Court Vacates
Arbitration Award Citing Manifest Disregard, 25 SEC. WEEK, NO. 29, at 4 (July 20,
1998).
14 105 F.3d at 1487.
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the antitrust laws,1 9 the securities laws,196 and other statutes
should not be deprived of their statutory rights because they have
agreed to arbitrate their claims.
Furthermore, there are powerful reasons why the manifest
disregard standard should be replaced by a broader standard for
review of any arbitration award, whether or not based on a statutory
claim. Because the manifest disregard standard protects an arbitral
award from vacatur if the arbitrators did not know the law, it en-
courages arbitrators not to find out what the law is and at the same
time penalizes parties who fail to bring the law to the arbitrators'
attention, either because of the inexperience of, or an error by,
counsel or because a party is acting pro se. Arbitrators should not
be potted palms.197 As decision-makers, they have an obligation to
ascertain what the law is and to apply it correctly. This is true gen-
erally, but it is most important when the dispute is not between
roughly equal commercial entities but between parties that are
unequal in wealth and sophistication. 8
This conclusion does not ignore the strong policy in favor of
the finality of arbitrations. An arbitral award should not be subject
to the same standard of judicial review as that applied to a jury
verdict or the trial court's judgment. The difficulty is how to formu-
late a standard of review of arbitral awards that reconciles the some-
times opposing policies of finality and justice. The federal courts
have provided some guidance here, when they have articulated a
non-statutory standard of review in such terms as irrationality, arbi-
"' Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628
(1985).
" Rodriguez de Quijas v. ShearsonlAmerican Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 481
(1989).
197 Credit for this metaphor must be given to Brendan Sullivan, attorney for Oliver
North in the televised Iran-Contra hearings of the 1980s.
' Professor Galanter has pointed out that the legal system favors the "haves" over
the "have-nots," largely because the "haves" tend to be "repeat players" (RP) who use
the legal system frequently, whereas the "have-nots" tend to be "one-shotters" ('OS")
who use the system only once or infrequently. Marc Galanter, Why the 'Haves' Come
out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 L. & Soc'Y REv. 95, 124
(1974). As a result, the "haves" enjoy 'layers of advantages . . . which interlock, rein-
forcing and shielding one another." Id. Under Professor Galanter's formulation, a bro-
ker-dealer firm is likely to be an RP, while its employee is most likely an OS.
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trariness, capriciousness, and fundamental unfairness. Perhaps the
best articulation of such a standard was given by Chief Justice Ellen
Peters of the Connecticut Supreme Court:
mThe "manifest disregard of the law" ground for vacating an arbitra-
tion award is narrow and should be reserved for circumstances of an
arbitrator's extraordinary lack of fidelity to established legal principles.
So delimited, the principle of vacating an award because of a mani-
fest disregard of the law is an important safeguard of the integrity of alter-
nate dispute resolution mechanisms. Judicial approval of arbitration deci-
sions that so egregiously depart from established law that they border on
the irrational would undermine society's confidence in the legitimacy of
the arbitration process .... Furthermore, although the discretion con-
ferred on the arbitrator by the contracting parties is exceedingly broad,
modem contract principles of good faith and fair dealing recognize that
even contractual discretion must be exercised for purposes reasonably
within the contemplation of the contracting parties.199
Although Judge Peters formulated her standard of review within
the general framework of manifest disregard of the law, it is evident
that she, like the Halligan court, was actually applying a different
standard: extraordinary lack of fidelity to established legal princi-
ples; egregious departure from established law. This seems to be an
appropriate standard of judicial review of arbitration awards for
non-statutory as well as statutory cases. It ties the validity of arbi-
tration awards to the legitimate expectations of both the parties and
the public. Moreover, it does not permit an erroneous award to be
confirmed simply because the losing party, or his or her attorney,
failed to dot all his "i's" or cross all his "t's," or because the arbitra-
tors did not have the capacity or the assiduousness to ascertain and
apply the correct law.
Under the standard of review proposed here, the claimant in
DiRussa would prevail. The arbitrators' failure to apply a totally
clear, mandatory requirement of a federal statute that is designed to
protect a disadvantaged class of persons constitutes an egregious
departure from established law. Whether the claimant in Halligan
would prevail under this standard is less certain, if only because the
Second Circuit's opinion did not make clear its basis for vacating
the award. If the reviewing court found that the arbitrators' denial of
relief to the claimant was not simply erroneous but arbitrary or
irrational, the award should be vacated.
1I Garrity v. McCaskey, 612 A.2d 742, 747-48 (Conn. 1992) (emphasis added).
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As Judge Peters suggests in the passage quoted above, the
proposed standard of review is based, at least in part, on contractual
grounds. Thus, it is consistent with the broad purpose of the FAA,
namely, to make agreements to arbitrate as enforceable as other
contracts. Arbitration is a creature of agreement, and, unless the
parties to an arbitration expressly agreed that the arbitrators were
not to be bound by established legal principles, it can be assumed
that the parties did not intend that the arbitrators would decide any
dispute between them in an arbitrary or irrational manner.
CONCLUSION
DiRussa and Halligan demonstrate, each in its own way, that
the manifest disregard of the law standard of review of arbitration
awards is inadequate and unsatisfactory. In DiRussa, strict adher-
ence to the manifest disregard standard deprived the claimant of his
statutory rights. In Halligan, the Second Circuit tacitly ignored the
standard in order to allow the claimant to receive his statutory
rights. The manifest disregard standard, as the Second Circuit has
interpreted it in the past, requires a court to confirm an arbitration
award despite the fact that such award is inconsistent with a federal
statute, unless (1) the law and its applicability to the case are totally
clear, and (2) the arbitrators understood the law but chose to disre-
gard it. In arbitrations of statutory claims, the manifest disregard
standard violates the precept announced by the Supreme Court
when it declared that agreements to arbitrate statutory, including
discrimination, claims were enforceable: "By agreeing to arbitrate a
statutory claim, a party does not forego the substantive rights afford-
ed by the statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral,
rather than a judicial, forum." 2" By immunizing erroneous arbitral
awards from vacatur unless the arbitrators are aware of their error,
the manifest disregard standard brings the arbitration process into
disrepute. It discourages arbitrators from assiduously ascertaining the
correct law. Less capable and lazy arbitrators, who are unable or
unwilling to discern the law, are less likely to have their decisions
overturned than are those who are diligent. At the same time, the
manifest disregard standard encourages lengthy arbitration proceed-
ings, since an attorney cannot risk failing to provide the arbitrators
__ Gilmer v. Interstateqohnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991) (quoting
Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 628).
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with every statutory provision, judicial decision, and administrative
ruling that may have possible relevance. Thus, the manifest disre-
gard standard not only introduces an unwelcome formalism into
arbitration proceedings, but it unduly penalizes the pro se claimant
and the claimant whose attorney is inexperienced or fails in his or
her diligence.
The courts are beginning to reject manifest disregard as the
proper standard of review in favor of a broader standard of review
of arbitration awards. Halligan is an example of such a case, al-
though Judge Feinberg purported to be applying the standard. It is
time for the courts to frankly recognize, as the District of Columbia
did in Cole, that the standard of review of arbitration awards in
statutory cases should be broad enough to ensure the vindication of
statutory rights. It should also be recognized that manifest disre-
gard, as interpreted by the lower federal courts since it was first
mentioned by the Supreme Court in dictum more than forty-five
years ago, is an inadequate standard of review even in non-statutory
cases. Under this standard, an error, no matter how serious, cannot
be corrected if the arbitrators were not aware of it when they made
their decision.
Judicial review of arbitration awards must be sufficient at least
to require arbitrators to follow the general outlines of the law. An
award should be vacated or modified if it shows an extraordinary
lack of fidelity to established legal principles or an egregious depar-
ture from established law. This is a workable standard that repre-
sents an acceptable balance between the finality that is an important
goal of arbitration and the accuracy and fairness that are
fundamental to the rule of law.
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